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itself ill prepared to handle the range of responsibilities required in a nation under the 
threat of terrorism. Police organizations hastily assigned resources to help mitigate areas 
hit hard by the attack while dispersing investigative capital to prevent future strikes. A 
stark realization would follow, exposing the demands of coping with counter-terrorism 
while balancing finite resources aimed at traditional crime fighting. These added 
challenges underscored the notion that American policing had entered a new era – 
Homeland Security. 
This thesis evaluates the options state police organizations have for adopting an 
appropriate style of policing for Homeland Security. A case study of the New Jersey 
State Police (NJSP) response to this challenge further examines how such organizations 
can transform their structures and processes to bolster their intelligence apparatus. The 
NJSP objective was to confront the challenges of Homeland Security while better 
equipping the organization to respond to its traditional investigative responsibilities. 
Using the example of the NJSP, the study provides a realistic set of solutions for other 
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For state police organizations, the impact of Homeland Security has carried with 
it varied responsibilities that beg for new policies, new structures, and new strategies. 
These organizations – situated on the front lines of an asymmetrical battlefield, across 
from an unknown enemy often outside the range and authority of the United States 
military – are at the center of the nation’s Homeland Security efforts. Supporting this 
notion, the Northeast Policy Forum, sponsored by the National Criminal Justice 
Association, identified state law enforcement as being on the “front lines of defense by 
collecting intelligence/criminal information, developing strategies to protect our 
communities and our critical infrastructures, hardening vulnerable targets, and preparing 
for aggressive responses to acts of terrorism.”1 However, even as government policy 
makers and politicians alike continue to frame the states’ role as paramount to our 
country’s security, the police themselves face unanswered questions about how best to 
carry out this new mission.  
The purpose of this thesis is threefold. It will argue that policing in general has 
moved into a new era of Homeland Security. By assessing contrasting policy options, it 
will offer an agenda for change that state police organizations can adopt when 
confronting the challenges inherent to policing in the Homeland Security Era. Finally, the 
research will explore how the New Jersey State Police imposed changes to its policies, 
structures, and strategies to tackle Homeland Security investigative challenges by 
adopting intelligence-led policing in both theory and practice, and attempt to demonstrate 
that such an organizational change may become generalizable to other state police 
organizations.  
Significantly, state police organizations are well-known for custom and tradition – 
meaning change is painful and slow. As a result, reform efforts are dependent more on 
cultural aspects that yield change than creative ideas that win support from change 
                                                 
1  National Criminal Justice Association, Final Report Northeast Policy Forum: Serving and 
Protecting in the Shadow of Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2003), 2. The 
National Criminal Justice Association. Serving and Protecting in the Shadow of Terrorism, 2. 
2 
advocates.2 Dr. Paul Stockton, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California, argues that organizations need two factors to divorce themselves from an 
institutional-stasis. First, an occurrence must demonstrate the status quo is problematic or 
obsolete. Second, an organization, in response to the event, must impose an agenda for 
change. A significant event alone is not enough; without an agenda for change, 
organizations continue performing in the status quo, making minor modifications that 
may appear as if change is occurring. Stockton graphically refers to this as “putting 
lipstick on the dinosaur.”3  
The attacks of September 11, 2001, clearly serve as an impetus for change for 
state police organizations, effectively discrediting the status quo of traditional policing. 
Since the terror attacks, it is widely accepted that in order to prevent terrorism, police 
must move away from long-established and primarily reactive policing strategies and 
towards carrying out strategies underscored by the principles of intelligence. The research 
has uncovered scores of documents that corroborate this notion. Both The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security and The 9/11 Commission Report have memorialized 
why government entities must move away from the status quo and draw upon creative 
means for preventing terrorism while ensuring Homeland Security.4 These documents 
have essentially sounded the call to arms for state law enforcement to change its business 
processes to include collecting and sharing intelligence to thwart future acts of terrorism.  
There has been no official mandate establishing American police organizations as 
key elements in our nation’s defense.5 Only the rallying call by the media and the public 
for the police to defend the homeland has thrust them into its newest venue. Anecdotal 
evidence at the state level, collected shortly after September 11, reveals that state police 
                                                 
2  J. Crank, Understanding Police Culture, 2nd ed, (Cinncinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing Co., 
2004), 4. 
3  Paul Stockton, “Law Enforcement and Judicial System Issues in Homeland Security.” Lecture, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 27, 2005.  
4  George W. Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Office of the White 
House, 2002); National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission 
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York, 
NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004). 
5  Nathan R. White, Defending the Homeland Domestic Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security, 
eds. Sabra Horne and Dawn Mesa (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2004), 54. 
3 
are practicing many new Homeland Security roles such as: a) coordinating Homeland 
Security at the state level; b) collecting, analyzing and sharing critical information and 
intelligence; c) protecting critical infrastructure and key assets; d) securing the nation’s 
borders, air, and sea ports; e) collaborating with federal and local law enforcement on 
task forces; and f) preparing for new response equipment, tactics, systems, and training.6 
The new principles and fundamental viewpoints that coincide with policing the homeland 
will foster the notion that policing has entered a new era – the Homeland Security Era. 
Success in their new Homeland Security role, promulgated by the Tenth 
Amendment and the focus on states’ responsibility for securing themselves, will require 
state police organizations to advance an agenda for change.7  The impact of Homeland 
Security on state law enforcement is too enormous for organizations to attempt 
retrofitting new strategies into old systems or to continue traditional forms of policing. A 
report from The Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University 
illustrates the enormous impact of Homeland Security on state law enforcement through a 
50-state survey conducted in 2003 of state and local law enforcement agencies.8 As 
Figure 1 indicates, survey respondents report that changing conditions inherent to 
Homeland Security have provided unprecedented roles for state law enforcement. 
According to the survey, state agencies are very much engaged in Homeland Security 





                                                 
6  The Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University Through support from the 
National Institute of Justice, The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles 
and Changing Conditions, 7. 
7  Also called the Police Powers Amendment, the Tenth Amendment reads, “The powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.” 
8  The Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University Through support from the 
National Institute of Justice, The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles 
and Changing Conditions. 
9  Ibid., 7. 
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 Approximately three quarters of state law enforcement agencies report a great 
amount of involvement in or serve as their state’s leader for gathering, analyzing 
and sharing terrorism-related intelligence. Overall, state police are much more 
involved today than before Sept. 11 in building their state’s intelligence 
capabilities, conducting terrorism-related investigations, and coordinating and 
planning for Homeland Security. 
 More than 70 percent of state agencies agree that their individual officers and 
investigators have significant new responsibilities in terrorism-related 
intelligence-gathering, investigations, and emergency response. These new 
requirements are having a substantial impact on state police intelligence, planning 
and grants-management efforts. 
 Local law enforcement agencies are requesting more operational assistance and 
support from state police today than before Sept. 11, particularly training, 
technical assistance, forensic science, specialized services, and help with 
computer crimes. State agencies have provided additional training and technical 
assistance to local agencies. 
 More than 75 percent of state agencies report that their assignment of personnel to 
federal task forces has increased or significantly increased since Sept. 11. While 
state police interaction with federal immigration officials has increased, federal 
support for drug and traditional crime investigations has decreased across the 
states. 
 Among many federal agencies, state and local law enforcement most commonly 
report increased levels of interaction since Sept. 11 with the FBI, Office for 
Domestic Preparedness and Immigration and Naturalization. 
 More than 60 percent of state police agencies report an increase in their 
interactions with corporate security representatives and private companies 
concerning facility security and worker background checks. Relationships with 
the private sector have generally increased, likely resulting in more state agency 
times and resources required for these public-private activities.          
Figure 1.   Key Findings from 50-state Survey  
(From: The Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University through 
support from the National Institute of Justice, The Impact of Terrorism on State Law 
Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles and Changing Conditions [Washington, D.C.:U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2005], 7.) 
 
Recognizing the difficulties associated with such institutional changes, this 
research paper seeks to answer the question: “What is the best strategy for state police 





B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
With the exception of Hawaii, every state has a state-level police organization. 
These organizations, with 56,348 members, represent approximately 7 percent of the total 
law enforcement officers nationwide.10 In contrast local police, account for 56% of the 
total number with 440,920 members nationwide.11 This may explain why a considerable 
amount of empirical research has focused more on local policing efforts reflective of city 
police departments involved in crime control strategies and counter-terrorism strategies 
than on the operations of state police organizations. Historical data and literature on 
states’ operational roles and activities related to terrorism are also virtually non-
existent.12 When it comes to state police organizations, there is a lack of parity in 
research.  
Breaking from the contemporary research pattern, this report will explore policing 
strategies aimed directly at the state level. It will examine the policy options that state 
police organizations can adopt when choosing a policing strategy for providing 
Homeland Security to their constituents. It is true that September 11 has affected all 
police agencies; however, because state police entities are filling the gaps and vacuums 
created by new roles and changes in policing conditions, it is paramount that research 
provides these organizations with an avenue worth modeling.13 
 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a paucity of existing empirical literature on the implementation of 
intelligence-led policing programs in the United States. In contrast, the body of 
knowledge related to Homeland Security, as one would expect, is capacious. When the 
two concepts are meshed for outcome results, again there is sparse empirical research. 
This probably exists, not because the interest on the academic level is not there, but 
                                                 
10  Bureau of Justice Statistics. “Law Enforcement Statistics,” 
[http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm], January 2006. 
11  Bureau of Justice Statistics. “Law Enforcement Statistics,” 
[http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm], January 2006. 
12  The Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University Through support from the 
National Institute of Justice, The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles 
and Changing Conditions, 11. 
13  Ibid., 7. 
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perhaps because Homeland Security and many of its dimensions are a relatively new 
phenomenon, and have not been operationalized and examined. These examinations are 
further complicated by the traditional reluctance of law enforcement agencies to share 
data and operational evaluations with other agencies or institutions. 
Intelligence-led policing remains a novel concept in American policing. Dannels 
and Smith (2001) investigated its implementation challenges within the Lexington 
County Sheriff's Department, South Carolina.14 Their research concluded that 
intelligence-led policing was an evolution of the Community Oriented Policing and 
Problem Oriented Policing strategies aimed at resource allocation and supervision. 
Resource allocation referred to equipment and personnel distribution related to crime 
solving initiatives.  
Carter (2004) on the other hand posits, “intelligence-led policing is explained 
from an operational perspective, illustrating its interrelationship with community-policing 
and Comp Stat.”15 His research, outlined in an intelligence guide for law enforcement 
agencies, draws a comparison between community-policing and intelligence-led policing 
for the sole reason that they rely equally on such methods as: information management, 
two-way communication, scientific data analysis, and problem solving.16 He views 
intelligence-led policing as the new dimension of community policing,17 capable of 
“providing meaningful and trustworthy direction to law enforcement decision makers 
about complex unlawful activities, including criminal enterprises and extremists, as well 
as terrorists.”18 
Peterson (2005) writes the aim of intelligence-led policing is targeting key 
criminal activities. “Once crime problems are identified and quantified through 
                                                 
14  David Dannels and Heather Smith. “Implementation Challenges of Intelligence Led Policing in a 
Quasi-Rural County.” Journal of Crime & Justice 24, no. 2 (2001).  
15  David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence:  A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Agencies 
(Washington, DC:  U.S. Department of Justice, November 2004), vi. Note: The Comp Stat acronym stands 
for “computer statistics.” It was originated by the New York City Police Department, as a multilayered 
strategy aimed at crime reduction, improvement of quality of life issues, and resource management. 
16  Ibid., 42.  
17  Ibid., 41. 
18  David L. Carter, “The Law Enforcement Intelligence Function: State, Local, and Tribal Agencies,” 
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 74, no. 6 (2005): 2. 
7 
intelligence assessments, key criminals can be targeted for investigation and 
prosecution.”19 Her research emphasizes the value of analysis in the field of criminal 
intelligence. The development of fusion centers in the United States, she adds, will 
bolster intelligence-led policing efforts.  
These fusion centers – derived from the watch centers of old – provide 
information to patrol officers, detectives, management, and other 
participating personnel and agencies on specific criminals, crime groups, 
and criminal activities. For example, they may support anti-terrorism and 
other specific objectives. The centers may search numerous public and 
private databases to gather and analyze information. They may also 
generate intelligence products of their own, providing overviews of 
terrorist or other crime groups, analysis of trends, and other items of 
information for dissemination to participating agencies.20 
In contrast to the new phenomena in America, intelligence-led policing finds its 
roots in the United Kingdom (UK) in the early 1990s. When the UK Audit Commission 
(1993) issued a report entitled Helping with Enquiries; Tackling Crime Effectively, it 
essentially spurred the dawn of intelligence-led policing.21 The report, grounded in the 
notion that crime control could be more economical, advocated the use of informants to 
prevent and solve crimes compared to the less effective measure of interrogations 
following the arrest of suspects. As reported by Ratcliffe (2003), the Audit Commission’s 
report contained three central tenets related to policing in the UK: a) existing roles and 
the level of accountability lacked integration and efficiency, b) the police were failing to 
make the best use of resources, and c) greater emphasis on tackling criminals would be 
more effective than focusing on crimes.22  
The Audit Commission report was followed by a broader strategy shift by Ericson 
(1994), who purported that surveillance systems could displace suspect populations, 
                                                 
19  Marilyn Peterson, “Intelligence-led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture (Washington, DC:  
U.S. Department of Justice, September 2005), 9. 
20  Peterson, “Intelligence-led Policing,” 9. 
21  Audit Commission, Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively. London: Audit 
Commission, 1993. 
22  JH Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-Led Policing.” Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 
248 (2003).  
8 
adding to the value of intelligence in the hands of the police.23 Maguire and John (1995) 
added to this debate by recognizing the value that integrating surveillance and informants 
have in engendering intelligence.24 Ericson and Haggerty (1997) in the noted text, 
Policing the Risk Society, contended the police, through their diverse information 
systems, had become brokers of information. Their research underscored the value of 
information technology in managing policing operations. Building on this research, 
Maguire (1999) argued that “diverse initiatives” were beginning to “improve aspects of 
police effectiveness.25 What these initiatives had in common were “strategic, future-
oriented, and targeted approach to crime control, focusing upon the identification, 
analysis, and management of persisting and developing problems or risks.”26  
Heaton (2000), reviewing Britain’s Home Office crime statistics at that time, by 
Barclay et. al. (1993), revealed that of all recordable crimes committed there was only a 3 
percent conviction rate in the courts.27 His assertion was that if police instead targeted the 
comparatively smaller number of recidivist offenders they would enjoy a higher rate of 
success in crime control endeavors while at the same time using fewer resources. 
Heaton’s research underscored the underlying rationale of the Audit Commission’s 
(1993) report: intelligence-led policing should focus less on past offenses than upon the 
behavior of those committing the significant portions of crime. The mantra of 
intelligence-led policing became “target the criminal, not just the crime.” 
In 2000, the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) produced a report 
detailing The National Intelligence Model. The NCIS provided the following definition 
for intelligence-led policing: 
 
                                                 
23  Richard Ericson, “The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice System Surveillance”, in M. 
McConville and L. Bridges (eds.) Criminal Justice in Crisis (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994), 139. 
24  M. Maguire and T. John, “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Informants: Integrated Approaches,” 
Police Research Group Crime and Prevention Series (1995). 
25  Mike Maguire, “Policing by Risks and Targets: Some Dimensions and Implications of Intelligence-
Led Crime Control,” Policing and Society 9 (1999): 316. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Robert Heaton, “The Prospects for Intelligence-led Policing; Some Historical and Quantitative 
Considerations,” Policing and Society 9, no. 4 (2000): 29. 
9 
Intelligence-led policing is the applications of criminal intelligence 
analysis as an objective decision making tool in order to facilitate crime 
reduction and prevention through effective policing strategies and external 
partnership projects drawn from an evidential base.28  
Ratcliffe (2003) has built upon the rationale of intelligence-led policing developed 
by the NCIS. His research conveyed that, “to be truly intelligence-led, the first stage of 
the model is to be able to interpret the criminal environment. This is usually performed 
by an intelligence section or unit, and relies on a broad range of information sources both 
within and external to the police service.”29 He follows this with two additional stages, 
which require the intelligence structure to influence decision-makers regarding crime 
reduction strategies and for decision-makers to explore ways to impact on the criminal 
environment using the intelligence generated by the intelligence apparatus. Ratcliffe 
(2004) completed a case study “exploring the difficulties of converting intelligence-led 
rhetoric into intelligence-led practice” within the New Zealand police.30 Ratcliffe noticed 
a recurrent theme throughout the interviews he conducted, “a lack of understanding of the 
role and place of intelligence within the organization, at the executive decision-making 
level.”31 
The understanding of intelligence-led policing gained from the body of 
knowledge produced by the UK researchers was valuable in terms of understanding this 
innovative policing style. Much of it was generalizeable to police organizations in 
operation within the United States. However, the intent of this thesis is to focus on 
implementing intelligence-led policing into an American state police organization that, 
by nature, is traditional and resistant to change. To this end, the literature review has 
exposed a gap in the body of knowledge this thesis intends to fill: exploring the 
implementation of intelligence-led policing into a state police organization. 
 
 
                                                 
28  National Criminal Intelligence Service, The National Intelligence Model (London: National 
Criminal Intelligence Service, 2000).  
29  Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-Led Policing,” 3. 
30  JH. Ratcliffe, “(in Press) the Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand 
Case Study,” Police Practice and Research, 11.  
31  Ibid. 
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D. HYPOTHESIS 
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 serve as a significant milestone in the 
history of state law enforcement. Consequently, this study will explore, first, how the 
terrorist attacks have thrust policing into the new era of Homeland Security. Second, it 
will address how the events themselves have engendered the question for state law 
enforcement organizations to consider, including which style of policing best suits these 
organizations for carrying out their new Homeland Security mission. Next, this study will 
analyze divergent policy options with the purpose of recommending the preferred course 
of action for state police organizations to adopt when policing the homeland. Lastly, the 
research will explore how the NJSP implemented the intelligence-led policing policy 
option into the architecture of their organization. The terrorists who spent time living 
amongst us were in areas under the purview of state police organizations. With proper 




Despite more than four years since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, the field of Homeland Security, as it relates to policing, is still rapidly 
evolving. As White (2004) points out, law enforcement commanders remain befuddled 
over the evolving issue of Homeland Security.32 It seems as though, from the perspective 
of a police executive, their capacity to provide solutions to questions that arise from the 
newness of the Homeland Security field is clearly outpaced by the rate at which the 
questions arise. This presents a unique challenge for researchers. For one, there are a 
multitude of critical issues that warrant attention, in particular, civil liberties, intelligence 
gathering, privacy rights, police organization and its structure.33 Yet, because no suitable 
sampling framework may exist, researchers must often rely on the comparative analysis 
of traditional policing problems when considering this type of Homeland Security issue. 
Recognizing this constraint, this research will compare and contrast conventional 
policing strategies using the policy options analysis method. 
                                                 
32  White, Defending the Homeland Domestic Intelligence, preface. 
33  Ibid. 
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In following the policy options analysis method, the research will provide a clear 
definition of the problem. It will explain why it is a problem, whom it affects, and how. 
By using an accurate representative sampling of sources from interviews, surveys, 
participant observations, government informational sources, and a review of existing 
literature, the research will recommend a strategy option that best addresses the problem. 
The researcher will achieve this by evaluating the proposed courses of action against the 
primary criteria considered as valuable to an effective policing organization functioning 
in the Homeland Security Era. Assessments of each of the alternative courses presented 
include the limits of each in terms of solving the problem and their resulting implications. 
In addition to the policy options analysis used for deciding the best course of 
action in policing the homeland, the author selected a case study method to evaluate how 
the NJSP structured intelligence-led policing into its framework. The protocol for this 
examination followed an embedded single case study of revelatory nature.34 The author 
leveraged the prospect of directly observing the mechanics of how intelligence-led 
policing and its associated processes integrated into the NJSP. This provided a notable 
opportunity to record and analyze the phenomenon of organizational change; something 
not always accessible in similar investigations. 
Throughout this case study, the research explored various evidential sources. 
These sources consisted of archival records, interviews, and direct participant 
observations. The archival records portion also specifically included a review of policy 
documents, training documents, organizational documents, surveys, official police 
reports, annual reports, other internal documents, media accounts, legal guidelines and 
related case laws for their value in this study.  
 
F. OUTLINE 
1. Chapter I – Introduction 
The apocalyptic aftermath experienced during the September 11 terrorist assault 
on America’s homeland provoked many police leaders to question the status quo in their 
choice of policing styles against the backdrop of Homeland Security. Because the 
                                                 
34  Robert K. Yin ed., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, third edition (Thousand Oaks, 
California: Sage Publications, 2003), 179. 
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terrorist events significantly impacted state police organizations in terms of added 
responsibilities and duties, questioning existing modes of policing is particularly relevant. 
This chapter will introduces the concept of breaching an organization’s institutional-stasis 
through a robust agenda for change that advances new means for confronting new 
challenges.  
 
2. Chapter II – What is Homeland Security? 
This chapter explores the new milieu of Homeland Security as it relates to 
domestic governmental actions. It provides an explanation for Homeland Security in the 
legal, political, and organizational context. This new characterization will give relevance 
to the challenges that await state police organizations that must now operate in this latest 
domain.  
 
3. Chapter III – Entering the Homeland Security Era 
This chapter argues that American policing has entered a new era: an era of 
Homeland Security. The fundamental argument is that the tragic events of September 11 
and the counter-terrorism prevention strategies that followed have overwhelmingly 
shaped the structure, policies, and practices of policing organizations nationwide, 
consequently thrusting policing into a contemporary age.  
 
4. Chapter IV - Evaluative Criteria for Policing the Homeland 
This chapter identifies and discusses the essential characteristics necessary for 
policing in the homeland. The elements of operational readiness, intelligence and 
warning, and strategic intelligence planning combine to form the compulsory ingredients 
integral for an effective Homeland Security police mission. For those state police 
organizations aiming to be effective in the Homeland Security domain, they will 
undeniably need to impose a management philosophy that integrates these valued criteria 




5. Chapter V – Alternative Paradigms for Policing the Homeland 
This chapter outlines three divergent philosophies that state police organizations 
might advance when confronted by the challenges inherent to Homeland Security. 
Professional policing, community policing, and intelligence-led policing make up the 
alternatives offered in this thesis. Each paradigm tenders its own unique attributes that 
signify the preferred style of policing. 
 
6. Chapter VI – Projecting the Outcomes 
This chapter explores each of the three paradigms of policing mentioned 
(professional policing, community policing, and intelligence-led policing) for their 
practical application in the Homeland Security venue. The research analyzes these 
alternatives, relative to state police operations, against the backdrop of evaluative criteria 
discussed in an earlier chapter. 
 
7. Chapter VII – Assessing the Options and Making a Recommendation 
For state police executives accepting that organizational change is compulsory, 
the challenge is to recognize what is the best plan to follow. The previous chapters 
outlined three distinct policing managerial philosophies, each one representing an agenda 
for change that state police organizations can adopt when deciding on how to best police 
the homeland. This chapter analyzes the trade-offs between each of the outcomes 
articulated previously and then make a recommendation to state police executives on 
which course of action to choose. 
 
8. Chapter VIII – Organizational Change and Intelligence-led Policing 
in the New Jersey State Police: A Case Study 
This chapter outlines the organizational changes the NJSP Investigations Branch 
has undertaken to infuse intelligence-led policing into its architecture. The case study 
details five strategic interventions the NJSP used to facilitate this change. The 
interventions included removing architectural barriers, adopting the processes intrinsic to 
an intelligence-led policing philosophy, creating a “Fusion Center,” retooling the 
distribution and management of its Statewide Intelligence Management System, and 
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adopting a regional accountability plan for managing intelligence and enforcement 
operations related to organized criminal activities. The chapter concludes by assessing the 
revisions the NJSP imposed against the backdrop of Homeland Security evaluative 
criteria. 
 
9. Chapter IX – Conclusion  
The final chapter culminates by answering the two questions raised in this thesis. 
First, has American policing entered the new era of Homeland Security? Second, what is 
the best model for state police organizations to adopt when confronting the challenges 
presented in this new era? Moreover, the chapter summarizes the NJSP Investigations 
Branch case study, which sought to integrate intelligence-led policing into its 
architecture. Lastly, the chapter provides recommendations for future research that may 
build on this thesis.  
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II. WHAT IS HOMELAND SECURITY? 
A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the 
damage and recover from attacks that do occur.35  
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, while our nation struggled 
to grasp the asymmetric threat that exposed our domestic flank, Homeland Security 
became a recognizable neologism throughout the United States. Although the phrase 
implies several connotations that include a national strategy, a department in our federal 
government, and, most importantly, a guiding philosophy that defines organizational 
missions and goals to determine policies and practices, it has fueled a debate involving 
the states and the federal government. At the core of this debate are the three significant 
guiding principles of the American government: federalism, Posse Comitatus, and the 
Tenth Amendment, each of which have implications for advancing the primary role of 
state and local law enforcement in defending the homeland. 
In essence, federalism is a system of decentralized power delegated to the states 
under the Constitution to keep the federal government from becoming a tyrannical body. 
During the period between 1787 and 1788, the author known only as “Publius” began 
writing a series of articles in The New-York Journal. The articles, 85 in total, known as 
“The Federalist Papers,” were intent on stirring the emotions of the public and the 
constitutional convention members. The real authors – John Jay, James Madison, and 
Alexander Hamilton – envisaged that their writings would promote support for ratifying 
the proposed Constitution. They were indeed correct, for today, over 200 years later; 
these writings uphold the underpinnings of the American tradition of federalism 
grounded in the United States Constitution. In Federalist #45, Publius described, “the 
powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary 
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and the internal 
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”36 The passage describes the authority, 
                                                 
35  Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2. 
36  Anonymous, The Federalist. The Famous Papers on the Principles of American Government, ed. 
Benjamin F. Wright (New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 1961), 328. 
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promulgated under the Constitution, for entrusting the states with the local duty of public 
health, safety, emergency management, and law enforcement.37 Perhaps, then, it is the 
tradition of federalism itself that seats state governments as the principal element in our 
Homeland Security.  
However, several noted national security experts argue that since terrorists from 
foreign countries pose the greatest threat to our Homeland Security, it is the military that 
should take up arms and provide for our common defense. As O’Connor (2005) points 
out, the common defense is the federal government’s responsibility stemming from the 
Preamble to the Constitution: “…to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”38 However, as was the 
case with the September 11 hijackers who carried out their covert operations inside our 
domestic borders, terrorists operating in the United States are outside the range of our 
military because the Posse Comitatus Act forbids them from carrying out domestic law 
enforcement. As with federalism, Posse Comitatus may place at least part of the 
responsibility for Homeland Security squarely on the shoulders of the states that are 
entrusted with dispensing local law enforcement. 
Moreover, the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ensures that states can 
exercise sovereignty from the federal government in producing state initiatives.39 Also 
called the Police Powers Amendment, the Tenth Amendment reads, “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”40 Is Homeland Security a state 
initiative protected by the Tenth Amendment? Even so, the trend that underscores 
Homeland Security efforts today focuses on prevention and preemption. Interestingly  
 
 
                                                 
37  T. O'Connor, “Homeland Security Overview & Statutory Authority,” 
[http://faculty.ncwc.edu/TOConnor/431/default.htm]. November 2005.  
38  Ibid.  
39  Ibid. 
40  Steve Mount, “The U.S. Constitution Online.” [http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html#Am10]. 
February 2006. 
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enough, that terminology is consistent with a mission of law enforcement rather than one 
of National Security, which preserves a global presence of engagement and 
containment.41 
Does it matter then that in defining Homeland Security there is much debate over 
who is responsible for it? Perhaps. O’Connor (2005) cites a two-sided debate involving 
the states and the federal government over the significance of Homeland Security.42 He 
adds that, on one side, Homeland Security is seen by the states as a local issue 
incorporating counter-terrorism initiatives into existing all-hazards strategies. He 
considers this a bottom-up approach to Homeland Security. In contrast, proponents for 
federal centralization of Homeland Security speak for “a seamless integrated system that 
protects all citizens.”43 The argument is that state governments are extremely limited in 
their capacities for handling terrorist attacks. O’Connor (2005) labels this the top-down 
approach to Homeland Security in that it requires federal standards to ensure best 
practices for Homeland Security.44 
An advocate of the top-down approach may argue the President’s National 
Strategy for Homeland Security is a federal standard that mandates best practices. The 
strategy defines its mission as mobilizing and organizing the nation to secure the 
homeland from terrorist attacks by coordinating a focused effort from our entire society – 
the federal government, state and local governments, the private sector, and the American 
people.45 Regardless of the side of the debate one chooses to promote, the national 
strategy – divided into six critical mission areas – provides a useful framework for 
aligning security efforts and critical decision making at both the federal and state levels. 
These areas include: 
Intelligence and Warning – Incorporates information collection and 
analysis techniques to detect and alert authorities of suspicious activity 
that, left unchecked, may lead to a terrorist event.  
                                                 
41  T. O'Connor . “Homeland Security Overview & Statutory Authority.”  
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid. 
45  Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 1. 
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Border and Transportation Security – Promotes innovative security 
initiatives that effectively and efficiently protect our borders and domestic 
transportation systems from the destructive objectives of terrorists.  
Domestic Counter-terrorism – Prioritizes the collective mission of 
federal, state, and local law enforcement towards preventing and 
interdicting terrorist activity.  
Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets – Focuses and 
improves efforts at securing the nation’s critical infrastructure 
components.  
Defending against Catastrophic Threats – Advances new approaches 
and strategies for preventing terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. 
Emergency Preparedness and Response – Prepares and consolidates 
emergency response plans to ensure federal, state, local, and private sector 
organizations are equipped and trained for emergencies.46 
Under the current debate, Homeland Security may seem amorphous to state law 
enforcement executives who may be weighing alternatives for adopting new policing 
strategies – particularly when the approaches to Homeland Security in their respective 
regions may wax and wane depending on the entities involved. Yet, the fact remains that 
ensuring Homeland Security will rely on preemptive methods that develop the abilities of 
the police to detect and disrupt terrorists before they can strike.47  
                                                 
46  Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security, viii. 
47  White, Defending the Homeland Domestic Intelligence, 61. 
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III. POLICING ENTERS THE HOMELAND SECURITY ERA  
The history of policing in America has been defined largely by three eras: the 
Political Era, the Professional Era, and the Community Era. Each of these periods carries 
with it its own set of characteristic ideologies or guiding philosophies.48 Henry (2003) 
argues that for policing as an institution as well as for individual agencies, the guiding 
philosophy of each era defines overall missions and goals, determines the kind of policies 
and practices that are developed, and generally shapes the way departments are organized 
and managed.49 The tragic events of September 11 and the counter-terrorism prevention 
strategies that followed have overwhelmingly shaped the structure, policies, and practices 
of policing organizations nationwide, thereby thrusting policing into a contemporary age. 
In his article The Era of Homeland Security: September 11, 2001, to …, Oliver (2005) 
argues this point by adapting the research of Kelling and Moore.50 Kelling and Moore 
scrutinized police organizational strategies in seven topic elements – authorization, 
function, organization, demand, environment, tactics, and outcomes – in order to 
differentiate the evolution of policing throughout American history.51 Table 1 reflects 
Oliver’s adaptation of Kelling and Moore’s work to include the Homeland Security Era 
of policing.  
                                                 
48  Vincent E. Henry, The COMPSTAT Paradigm: Management Accountability in Policing, Business, 
and the Public Sector (Flushing, NY: Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc., 2003), 73. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Willard M. Oliver, “The Era of Homeland Security: September 11, 2001, to ...” Crime and Justice 
International 21, no. 85 (2005): 10. 




Table 1. The Four Eras of Policing based upon Organizational Strategy  
(From: W.M. Oliver, “The Era of Homeland Security: September 11, 2001, to…” Crime 
and Justice International 21, no. 85) 
 
Shortly after the terrorist attacks, in a landmark decision President Bush 
established an Office of Homeland Security within the White House, signaling the 
Government’s important mission of protecting the homeland from future assaults.52 One 
of the first orders of business for this new office was to produce a strategic document that 
would rally the nation’s efforts from federal, state, local, and the private-sector agencies 
toward a mission of Homeland Security. By delineating three strategic objectives of 
Homeland Security in order of priority, the intent was to channel the energy and 
commitment in support of the national and [future] local strategies.53 The three objectives 
are:  
• Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 
• Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and 
• Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur, 
Collectively, these objectives steer law enforcement organizations when dedicating 
resources needed to avert terrorism and the consequences associated with attacks. 
                                                 
52  Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security, introductory letter. 
53  Ibid. 
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security has provided police a mandate for 
defending our nation in this new era. It has essentially embodied a new spirit in American 
policing, by articulating a new philosophy intended to generate innovation and 
organizational change among police organizations. Advancing these creative changes will 
undoubtedly affect long and short-term operations and radically alter existing 
organizational structures. The New York City Police Department (NYPD), the New 
Jersey State Police (NJSP), and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) 
have all experienced organizational transformation in response to the Homeland Security 
Era. 
In a recent issue of The New Yorker Online, William Finnegan explored the 
NYPD’s adaptation to defending the homeland.54 He claims that before September 11, 
NYPD had fewer than 24 officers working in the counter-terrorism field. Today, they 
have established a Counter-Terrorism Bureau and redeployed more than 1,000 police 
officers to impose preventive measures through Operations Atlas, Nexus, and Hercules.55 
By realigning its organizational structure, the NYPD has mustered an impressive array of 
resources now aimed at counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism deployments, intelligence 
and threat information, infrastructure protection, training for private sector security 
personnel, physical security planning for special events, critical incident response, and an 
NYPD website that disseminates important messages to the private sector are all in the 
NYPD’s arsenal to counter-terrorism attacks.56 New York City has also launched a 24-
hour-a-day hot line for terrorism tip and leads.57 
Across the river from New York, the NJSP has also imposed sweeping 
organizational change in responding to Homeland Security demands. First, the NJSP took 
an unprecedented step of forming a Homeland Security Branch. In a conversation with 
the author on December 27, 2005, Colonel Joseph Fuentes revealed that by focusing on 
                                                 
54  W. Finnegan, “Defending the City,” [http://www.newyorker.com/online/content/articles/050725]. 
December 2005. 
55  The National Criminal Justice Association, Serving and Protecting in the Shadow of Terrorism, 2. 
56  “NYPD Shield Homepage,” [http://www.nypd2.org/nyclink/nypd/html/ctb/resources.html]. 
November 2005. 
57  National Criminal Justice Association, Final Report Northeast Policy Forum: Serving and 
Protecting in the Shadow of Terrorism, 2. 
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the organization’s table of organization, it became readily apparent that, at the time, the 
existing structure could not support the rapid response or continued effort needed for the 
new era of force protection. By realigning his units that shared similar responsibilities for 
Homeland Security under a centralized command structure, he essentially enabled the 
NJSP to rise to an elevated threat level and stay there. Second, the NJSP transformed its 
existing Investigations Branch to confront the investigative challenges of Homeland 
Security. This transformation, discussed in a later chapter (Chapter VIII), is grounded in 
the principles of intelligence-led policing and illustrates another prevailing sign of a shift 
in policing philosophies: Police organizations are implementing intelligence collection 
and sharing strategies aimed at prevention. 
On the west coast, the LASD has retooled their organizational framework to focus 
on Homeland Security. Through the creation of a Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) group, 
the LASD has focused its resources on intelligence exchange to prevent terrorist attacks. 
The TEW is a multi-jurisdictional intelligence center responsible for building cooperative 
efforts needed to maintain the response capabilities in the Los Angeles County area.58 
The TEW group focuses its operational efforts on threat identification, early warning, and 
real-time situation assessment. Sullivan (2005) cites a reported increase in terrorist 
transactions with transnational organized crime as another reason that underscores the 
need for TEW.59 The TEW remains a model intelligence center for police organizations 
nationwide exploring the concept of “all hazards.”  
Although these examples are limited to three distinct organizations, the 
characteristic ideologies and guiding philosophies of Homeland Security on policing 
institutions nationwide are extensive.60 Today, the principal funding streams available for 
financing police initiatives are under federal Homeland Security grant programs. 
Homeland Security monies have replaced the traditional law enforcement funding 
mechanisms from the past. The Local Law Enforcement Block Grant, the Edward Byrne 
Memorial Grant, and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grant saw huge 
                                                 
58  John Sullivan, Intelligence for Homeland Security: Organizational and Policy Challenges (lecture, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 29, 2005).  
59  Ibid. 
60  Note: It is expected that examples similar to these would be limited at this point, as the Homeland 
Security Era in reality is only four years old. 
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cuts in the 2005 Federal Budget.61 Instead, the three main programs for law enforcement 
organizations to obtain funds are the State Homeland Security Grant program, the Law 
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention program, and the Urban Area Security Initiative.62  
In addition, police training programs nationwide currently include elements of 
Homeland Security practices and counter-terrorism. The Bureau of Justice Assistance 
(BJA) has made available grant funds and technical assistance for counter-terrorism 
prevention and response training programs around the country.63 The BJA’s State and 
Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) has educated well over 30,000 law enforcement 
officials nationwide and has created a train the trainer curriculum to enable each state to 
increase its capacity for counter- terrorism training.64 Moreover, the narrow margin of 
error associated with failing to recognize terrorist related activity or failing to respond 
effectively to other catastrophes has compelled police organizations nationwide to 
incorporate Homeland Security practices into their policies and protocols. Like other 
police organizations, the NJSP Investigations Branch has incorporated language in their 
standing operating procedures (SOP) that ensures commanders are responsible for 
sharing information related to terrorist activity. For instance, all Bureau level SOP within 
the hierarchal structure of the Investigations Branch contain the following language; “The 
Bureau Chief will ensure that any information or intelligence related to terrorism  
acquired by personnel under their command is immediately forwarded to the Regional 
Operations Intelligence Center, in order to ensure a timely investigative and/or security 
response.”65  
“While it is true that all types of police agencies have been significantly affected 
post-September 11, it seems that state law enforcement agencies have been affected the 
                                                 
61  G. Voegtlin and J. Boyter, “2005 Federal Budget Proposal Released; State and Local Law 
Enforcement Assistance Programs Face Cuts,” 
[http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=233&issue_id=3
2004>]. December 2005. 
62  Ibid. 
63  National Criminal Justice Association, Final Report Northeast Policy Forum: Serving and 
Protecting in the Shadow of Terrorism, 5. 
64  Ibid. 
65  Note: As a participant observer, this researcher was able to participate in creating the final version 
of the new standing operating procedures for the NJSP Investigations Branch. 
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most.”66 For state police organizations whose responsibilities extend well beyond the 
territorial boundaries of single communities and encompass large regional and functional 
jurisdictions, resource allocation is a primary concern for daily and strategic operations. 
State police organizations, in conjunction with highway patrol, general policing, and 
other duties that run the gamut from specialized investigations to technical support, must 
balance resources needed to advance other Homeland Security initiatives. The initiatives 
have had a considerable impact on state police organizations. Figure 2 illustrates the 
contrast between state and local law enforcement organizations’ allocation of resources 
toward Homeland Security. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Allocation of Resources by State and Local Law Enforcement  
(From: The Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University through 
support from the National Institute of Justice, The Impact of Terrorism on State Law 
Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles and Changing Conditions [Washington, D.C.:U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2005], 18.) 
 
                                                 
66  The Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University Through support from the 
National Institute of Justice, The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles 
and Changing Conditions, 7. 
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The following quote cited from the report by The Council of State Governments 
and Eastern Kentucky University, provides a detailed explanation of Figure 2:  
As indicated by the red bars, three-quarters or more of all state-level 
respondents indicated they allocated more resources to security for critical 
infrastructure, special events and dignitaries; intelligence gathering, 
analysis and sharing; and terrorism-related investigations. Not reflected in 
this figure, state agencies were most likely to report fewer resources to 
drug enforcement and traditional criminal investigation. A majority of 
states, however, reported no change in allocation of resources for these 
two operational responsibilities.  
State agencies were more likely than local ones to report allocating more 
resources for most operational responsibilities, except for airport security, 
community-policing, drug enforcement and investigation, traffic safety 
and traditional criminal investigation. Fewer than 22 percent of state and 
local agencies reported allocating additional resources to traffic safety and 
traditional criminal investigation. 
Although the patterns of resource allocation or reallocation since Sept. 11 
were similar among state and local agencies, there were notable 
differences. Is this still part of the quote?  If so it needs to be indented .5” 
from the right margin 
A greater percentage of state agencies reported the allocation of more 
resources to 10 to 15 comparable responsibilities, suggesting that these 
concerns have had a larger impact (as measured by allocation of more 
resources) on state agencies than on local ones. 
 
State agencies were substantially more likely than local agencies to report 
devoting more resources to border security; commercial vehicle 
enforcement; security for critical infrastructure; security for special 
events and dignitaries; intelligence gathering, analysis and sharing; 
terrorism-related investigations. 
 
Unlike state agencies, local ones did not report allocating substantially 
more resources for any operational responsibility since Sept. 11.   
After analyzing responses by the type of state agencies and size of local 
agencies, the most striking differences are found in responses of small and 
larger agencies. As with state agencies, a relatively high percent of large 
local agencies reported allocating more resources to security for critical 
infrastructure, events and dignitaries, intelligence gathering, analysis and  
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sharing; terrorism-related investigations. Small local agencies were 
consistently less likely to report allocating more resources for various 
operational responsibilities.67  
In addition, the overall function and responsibilities in support of state law 
enforcement have transformed radically since September 11. Homeland Security now 
dominates the missions of these law enforcement organizations. Figure 3 illustrates the 
2004 survey administered by the Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky 
University. The survey identified the percentage of state law enforcement agencies who 
reported sizeable contributions to their state’s Homeland Security initiatives. The 
assessment revealed that state law enforcement officers and investigators have seen 
increased responsibilities in the areas of investigating terrorist acts, responding to terrorist  
events, terrorism-related intelligence gathering and conducting vulnerability 
assessments.68 The survey results also reported changes among state-level officers’ and 
investigators’ duties and responsibilities to be more substantial than those of their local 
contemporaries.69  
 
                                                 
67  The Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University Through support from the 
National Institute of Justice, The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles 
and Changing Conditions, 19. 
68  The Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University Through support from the 
National Institute of Justice, The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles 
and Changing Conditions, 24. 
69  Ibid. 
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Figure 3.   Homeland Security Roles for State Law Enforcement 
(From: The Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University through 
support from the National Institute of Justice, The Impact of Terrorism on State Law 
Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles and Changing Conditions [Washington, D.C.:U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2005].) 
 
Unmistakably, advancing Homeland Security and its coupled initiatives have 
significantly altered the face of our nation’s law enforcement efforts. Its effect on the 
organizational structure and functions of police agencies has transformed some 
organizations, most notably state police and large urban police departments, into small 
armies capable of moving resources and personnel in the direction of affected problem  
areas exposed by current intelligence reporting. In the history of American policing, 
nothing has advanced the “dialectical process of integrating diverse ideas and practices” 






                                                 
70  Henry recognizes this phenomenon when he speaks to “the gradual dialectical process of 
reconciling different ideas and practices that result in organizations adopting policies and practices of a new 
philosophy while continuing some practices and policies of older philosophies.” See Henry, The 
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IV. EVALUATIVE CRITERIA FOR POLICING THE HOMELAND 
In this new era of policing, state law enforcement professionals will face new 
problems that require a blend of urgent action and strategic planning, while still 
addressing crime issues from bygone eras. Even the most credible threat of a pending 
terrorist attack will not disrupt the determined street gang or drug trafficking enterprise 
from carrying out their intended transgressions. Organized crime figures, in particular, 
are unabashed in their efforts to find prospective criminal ends while other more pressing 
issues find a way to consume the efforts of the police. “We are today,” says President 
George Bush, “a Nation at risk to a new and changing threat.”71 The President speaks to 
this threat as one of terrorism that takes many forms, has many places to hide, and is 
often invisible.72 Yet, this threat is even more significant and takes on an added 
dimension when combined with the bulk of traditional crime problems that already affect 
society. Those in charge of state law enforcement organizations will need to develop 
strategies and crime control operations that engage “all hazards all crimes” if they are to 
be effective in preserving the nation’s Homeland Security. 
An important factor for carrying out a strategy designed to confront the 
complexities of policing in the Homeland Security Era is to unearth a policing philosophy 
capable of a diverse set of principles. It should include the capacity to promote and 
sustain operational readiness. It should also be capable of maintaining a robust apparatus 
for delivering intelligence and warning. In principle, the philosophy should also promote 
strategic intelligence planning at its foundation. These principles will provide evaluative 
criteria useful for judging policy options that state police will choose from when deciding 
on how best to police the homeland. 
 
A. OPERATIONAL READINESS 
State police organizations, post September 11, have a duty and obligation to 
express a high degree of readiness. In an interview with the author on March 10, 2005, 
Brigadier General Simon Perry, of the Israeli Police and Ministry of Public Safety, 
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argued the ability to defend against threats is contingent on an organization’s capacity to 
sustain operational readiness. Operational readiness, he proclaimed, is the sum of several 
factors: a) the coordination of specialized intelligence units; b) a police force trained in 
intelligence; c) targeted objectives designed to increase intelligence operations; and d) 
strategic actions employed against criminal networks.  
Given that information is such a critical feature in modern societies, policing 
organizations operating in the new milieu of Homeland Security must contain specialized 
units capable of ferreting out information that suggests criminal or terrorist activity.73 As 
is the case with reactive policing models, the police derive information after an event. 
With terrorism, this is intolerable because the margin of error is narrow and risk to the 
public is great. The best-case scenario would be if the police could have information 
before or during the occurrence of a criminal act.74 Specialized intelligence units carry 
out the concept of proactive policing using intelligence, informants, and surveillance to 
try to provide such an edge.75  
In effect, General Perry’s tacit knowledge of counter-terrorism strategy buttressed 
what Nathan White, in his book Defending the Homeland: Domestic Intelligence, Law 
Enforcement, and Security, affirms: “most importantly, the police should not be viewed 
as a reactive force. Because of their investigative and intelligence capabilities, they have 
the unique opportunity to strike terrorists before terrorists can attack…the American 
police are in a perfect position to engage in intelligence gathering activities and expand 
their role in national defense.”76 Yet, having a state police force trained in intelligence 
involves an organization’s universal acceptance that intelligence is the driving force 
behind all strategic and tactical operations regardless of the activity. The result is the 
collection and analysis of information that guides all enforcement, investigative, and 
security initiatives. 
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According to General Perry, the Israel National Police employ a tactic called 
“blanket intelligence coverage,” which involves establishing intelligence assets 
throughout communities that, although legitimate, may indirectly support criminal or 
terrorist activities. For instance, applying this concept in the United States would be 
advantageous for state policing organizations to establish communications – either covert 
or overt – with members in certain industries that unknowingly support criminal activity. 
One case in point would be the hotel industry that serves both legitimate and illegitimate 
patrons. In particular, in the days leading up to the September 11 attacks, the hijackers 
gathered in hotel rooms near selected airports.77 Those events only serve to underscore 
the need for state police organizations to task informers in the future to be alert for 
suspicious activity in and around hotels. Having a base of information sources able to 
supply the state police with accounts of suspicious activity can assist in the operational 
readiness of the organization. Blanket intelligence coverage is one example of a targeted 
objective designed to increase intelligence operations. 
It may seem that to disrupt organized criminal groups or terrorist cells the police 
must target them directly. Law enforcement practitioners will argue that, since the 
criminal justice system may lack the agility to disrupt criminal networks, the police 
should rely on alternative methods for disruption. For instance, strategic actions 
employed against money remitters may curtail money-laundering efforts by organized 
criminals. Enforcing local ordinances or traffic violations may do more to remove the 
opportunities criminals and terrorists exploit than actually arresting offenders. 
Regardless, the outcome is the prevention of crime and terrorism. The Israel National 
Police, recognizing an inexorable link between money laundering and terrorism, 
proactively target money launderers even in the absence of any specific knowledge of 
terrorism associations.78 As the Israelis’ example demonstrates, strategic measures 
against criminal networks require creativity. 
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B. INTELLIGENCE AND WARNING 
The goal of Homeland Security is the preemptive mitigation of a threat. This 
requires organizational objectives that institute policies that foster prevention. For state 
policing organizations, it may involve “policy analysis, reorganization, intelligence 
gathering” and information processing systems.79 Terrorism depends on surprise; with it, 
a terrorist attack has the potential to do massive damage to an unwitting and unprepared 
target. Without it, the terrorists stand a good chance of exposure by authorities, and even 
if they are not, the damage from their attacks is likely to be less severe.80 Through 
proactive defense strategies, including warning intelligence systems, policing 
organizations can defeat the surprise needed by terrorists to commit their odious acts.  
The National Strategy of Homeland Security lists “Intelligence and Warning” as a 
critical mission area that focuses mainly on preventing terrorist attacks.81 Today, state 
policing organizations must reconfigure their architecture to promote the intelligence and 
warning function to prevent surprise from terrorists and the scourge of organized 
criminals. As a concept, Homeland Security involves active defense, but it specifically 
calls for a type of intelligence strongly tied to creating warning.82 Warning intelligence 
requires a fast transfer of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. It focuses 
on the premonitory awareness of threats in order to discern preventive actions. It requires 
the fusion of information from “conventional and unconventional approaches.”83 
For state policing organizations, promoting warning intelligence will require 
establishing an intelligence fusion center. The Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative, sponsored by the Department of Justice, defines a fusion center as an effective 
and efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, 
streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by merging 
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data from various sources.84 The guidelines set forth for fusion centers intend for them to 
integrate law enforcement, public safety, and private sector entities toward the goal of 
developing robust collaborative environments. It is likely the finished products from 
these intelligence centers will leverage opportunities for preventing, interdicting, and 
solving crimes. 
In the new era of policing, it is vital that state policing organizations increase their 
capacities for supplying and processing warning intelligence. In the past, most state 
police organizations were event driven, waiting for events to happen and then responding 
appropriately. Now society expects law enforcement entities to “connect the dots” and 
prevent incidents before their occurrence. Yes, it may be a challenge at first for the state 
police to break from more traditional reactive models, but Homeland Security calls for 
doing things inherently different. Getting serious about Homeland Security will require 
the state police to make changes that foster intelligence and warning systems needed to 
prevent terror attacks.  
 
C. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PLANNING 
Strategic intelligence planning is the process for shaping organizational direction 
and strategies to achieve desired outcomes by ensuring adequate effort is put into the 
collection of intelligence. Strategic intelligence planning offers state policing 
organizations the ability to set priorities and earmark assets to address those priorities. 
The process affords commanders an analytical view towards the challenges their 
organizations may face, whether criminal or terror related. It offers an introspective 
assessment of the organization’s own capacities. In certain cases, it may provide 
awareness of the organization’s operating environment, describing legal, political, 
demographic, social, and economic factors. Lastly, the process can supply a vulnerability 
assessment that identifies and evaluates certain industries, geographical areas and 
populations in terms of their susceptibility for exploitation by organized criminal 
elements or terrorists. 
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In an age when competing interests can easily distract state police commanders 
from their vital missions, strategic intelligence planning provides a systematic approach 
toward carrying out these desired outcomes. It provides managers with an extended 
capacity for coping with the challenges that confront their organizations. It results in 
greater allocation of resources based on objective needs. It takes advantage of 
organizational strengths while limiting exposure brought on by organizational 
weaknesses. The environment that today’s state police organizations maneuver in only 
serves to underscore the need for strategic intelligence planning as a fundamental element 
toward developing effective policing and crime reduction strategies. 
A typical state police jurisdiction presents several challenges for the responsible 
policing entity. The calls for service and traffic enforcement warrant constant attention. 
The investigations of crimes – both petty and serious – draw upon an organization’s finite 
investigative resources. Community outreach programs, the backbone of an earlier 
policing era, also demand concentration. The seemingly relentless rise in terror alerts 
consume investigative and security assets, sometimes for long periods. Collectively these 
obligations can devour any state police organization’s reserves. Measuring responses to 
the challenges present in Homeland Security requires alternative strategies. 
*** 
A state policing organization aiming to be effective in the Homeland Security Era 
will undeniably need to impose a management philosophy that integrates the above-
mentioned criteria into its purpose. The next chapter will assess three primary policing 
philosophies against the backdrop of these criteria. 
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V. ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS OF POLICING  
The central theme of a policing style is to aid an organization through navigating 
the challenges faced while affecting crime control strategies and the delivery of services 
to the public. However, with over 17,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide and 
nearly 800,000 full time sworn law enforcement officers, there is no one style of policing 
that is practiced consistently throughout the United States.85 While the history of modern 
American policing has endured several ideological reform movements, often, police 
organizations adopt a tailored style of policing that is more a hybrid of many policing 
philosophies, choosing the best aspects from each to serve the needs of their jurisdiction. 
These philosophies, designed to manage police operations, consist of rigorous principles 
that guide police action while setting them apart from the other reform movements. 
Policing philosophies, when applied in the field, in reality morph to fit local 
interpretations influenced by jurisdictional factors. Yet today, the policing environment 
has changed drastically with all police organizations compelled to adopt a style of 
policing that is flexible enough to address the challenges police are likely to face, while 
still preserving rights afforded to its constituents by the Constitution.86 Ratcliffe (2004) 
argues the rapid changes in the criminal environment include transnational crime 
becoming more transnational while organized criminals manage themselves more 
methodically.87 Terrorists – both international and domestic – have also shaped the 
environment in which the police operate, exerting tremendous influence over how the 
police must function to protect its citizens from the death and destruction or the fear that 
terrorism invokes. If that is not enough, national disasters – from hurricanes, tsunamis, 
tornadoes, floods, and earthquakes – regularly consume the resources of the police in  
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planning for and responding to these tragic events. In all, the ever-expanding role of law 
enforcement to combat a broader array of ills does not correspond with an equal 
expansion in resources.88 
The central theme of this thesis will answer the fundamental question: What is the 
best course of action for state police organizations to adopt as an agenda for change in 
confronting the challenges of the Homeland Security Era? In constructing the alternative 
solutions for this problem, the research focused on existing knowledge related to policing 
philosophies practiced in the United States today. Using a policy options analysis, the 
thesis distilled alternative policing solutions into three options. They include the 
Professional Model of policing, Community-policing, and Intelligence-led Policing. 
What follows is an explanation of each style of policing. 
 
A. PROFESSIONAL MODEL OF POLICING 
The Professional Model of policing entails insulation from undue 
influence, corruption control, bureaucratic structures and clearly 
delineated lines of authority, the imposition of civil service hiring and 
promotion standards, effective and efficient crime control, tighter 
supervision, and enhanced training and education for police officers.89  
The vestiges of the Professional Model of policing are rooted in virtually every 
police department in the United States. First constructed as a means to control corruption 
and misconduct (byproducts of an earlier era of policing known as the Political Era), the 
Professional Model aimed to alleviate the domination of political influences over police 
operations. The Professional Model afforded tighter supervision over personnel and 
centered on responding to incidents of crime while providing service to the public. The 
mantra of the Los Angeles Police Department: “To Protect and Serve” best captures the 
essence of the Professional Model of policing. In effect, the Professional Model of 
policing has raised the skill sets and efficiency of law enforcement officers nationally.   
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August Vollmer, the police chief for Berkeley, California, from 1905 to 1932, is 
regarded as the “patriarch of police professionalism.”90 His vision of policing as a 
complex enterprise, demanded intelligence, knowledge, and social skills, and required 
advanced training and higher education for police to transform themselves into scientific 
crime fighters.91 Vollmer is credited with introducing America to such things as 
stoplights, police car radios, crime laboratories, and lie detectors, and was a strong 
advocate for the use of motorized patrol to provide quicker service.92 These innovations 
and a variety of other management techniques introduced by Vollmer sought to 
strengthen efficiency by the police in a cost-effective way.93 Vollmer’s focus on 
bureaucratic structure, cost-efficiency, and clear lines of authority remains the hallmark 
of the Professional Model. Of course, this requires an organizational bureaucracy to 
fulfill essential functions in ways other organizational structures cannot.94  
Rapid response to crimes and calls for service highlight the aim of efficiency 
intrinsic to the Professional Model. For the uniform patrol officer, responding to 
incidents, reporting on them, and then resuming random patrol to respond again consume 
much of their time. The public, conditioned with this style of policing, equates response 
time and patrol visibility with professional policing. There are examples in which the 
police can credit the prevention of crimes and saved lives with a rapid response time.  
To some it may seem the Professional Model of policing is an effective model for 
crime prevention. However, a closer look reveals the model concentrates too much on 
reactive measures. A crime or incident must take place before the bureaucratic muscle 
can flex itself and respond accordingly. Since the goal today is prevention, the 
Professional Model is already at odds with achieving this objective. Organizations that  
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primarily adopt the Professional Model will find that, regardless of its application in 




Community-policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the 
delivery of police services that includes aspects of traditional law 
enforcement, as well as prevention, problem-solving, community 
engagement, and partnerships. The community-policing model balances 
reactive responses to calls for service with proactive problem-solving 
centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Community-policing 
requires police and citizens to join together as partners in the course of 
both identifying and effectively addressing these issues.95 
Why would a car without license plates parked with its hood up in one 
neighborhood receive different treatment than a car parked comparably in a different 
neighborhood? In 1969, when Dr. Philip Zimbardo, a psychologist from Stanford 
University, conducted an experiment by parking a test car in the Bronx, New York, in a 
dilapidated neighborhood, it did not take long before the community turned the car upside 
down and outright destroyed it. When he conducted the same experiment in Palo Alto, 
California, he had different results. The community left the car alone. After Zimbardo 
vandalized the car himself, he found the community reacted differently to it parked on the 
street. Within a short time, the car met the same fate as the car he parked in the Bronx. 
Zimbardo had discovered that at the community level, crime and disorder are implicitly 
linked. 
Zimbardo’s experiment later became the genesis for the Broken Windows Theory 
developed by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling.96 They believed that if a building 
owner left a window damaged it would not be long before the community shattered the 
rest of the building’s windows. An unattended window would be merely an indication to 
the community that no one cares. The same holds true for other quality of life offenses 
such as graffiti, squeegee men, loiterers, turnstile jumpers, prostitutes, public drinking,                                                  
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and urinating in public. They are all signs to the community that no one cares and 
essentially these seemingly insignificant conditions become precursors for an 
environment that breeds more serious and violent crimes. The Broken Windows Theory 
forms the lattice to which the Community-policing model attaches itself. 
The Community-policing philosophy arrived in the late 1980s. It was born out of 
a response to the estranged relationship between the police and the public, and both the 
political and public pressure for improving such relations.97 Perhaps the seemingly 
inexorable failure associated with the traditional Professional Model led police 
professionals to reevaluate crime reduction strategies. They deduced that focusing 
carefully on the quality of life issues of the community itself, apart from just responding 
to incidents of crime, could reduce crime and the fear of crime, eventually improving the 
quality of life for all community members. Reminiscent of the theories of Zimbardo, 
Wilson and Kelling, community policing took hold and emerged as the new trend in 
American policing. 
Neighborhood watch groups, Drug Abuse Resistance Education officers, 
community meetings, community outreach officers, door-to-door visits, police 
storefronts, school resource officers, bike patrols, police newsletters, and amnesty gun 
buy-back programs are all examples of community-policing strategies. In these examples, 
the police become problem solvers, identifying the full range of problems experienced by 
community residents; working with community residents to develop strategies for 
addressing those problems; and bringing in the appropriate public and nonprofit agencies 
to implement those strategies.98 Typically, officers assigned to community-policing 
programs do not respond to calls for service. Instead, they spend more time in 
community-based activities engaged in social work and problem solving, while their 
contemporaries respond to calls for service in the traditional sense. Much to the 
satisfaction of the community, police departments station these officers directly within 
problem areas instead of at traditional stations or precinct postings. 
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Of course, similar to the Professional Model, Community policing has its 
skeptics. While many people may think that Community policing is an effective policing 
strategy, the vision of Community policing generally failed to deliver what it promised – 
to reduce crime and fear of crime and to substantially improve the quality of life of its 
constituents.99 According to the landmark report to the United States Congress, 
Community-policing strategies, specifically Neighborhood Watch, community meetings, 
door-to-door visits, police storefronts, and police newsletters have done little to reduce 
crime and are ineffective.100 Regardless of the evidence, police leaders and the public 
have continued to articulate ways in which Community policing is a useful and beneficial 
tool. 
 
C. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
Intelligence-led policing involves the collection and analysis of 
information to produce an intelligence end-product designed to inform 
police decision-making at both the tactical and strategic levels. It is a 
model of policing in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations, 
rather than the reverse. It is innovative and, by some standards, even 
radical, but it is predicated on the notion that a principal task of the police 
is to prevent and detect crime rather than simply to react to it.101 
The Audit Commission of Britain published a landmark report in 1993 stating that 
“a relatively small number of individuals account for a substantial proportion of detected 
crime. The deterrence or incapacitation of these individuals could therefore potentially 
make a substantial impact on the crime problem.”102 This report, titled “Helping With 
Enquiries – Tackling Crime Effectively,” was commissioned to assess the impact of 
police operations on crime control. It has served as the foundation for intelligence-led 
policing. 
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At the time the Audit Commission’s report was presented there was skepticism 
over how effective the police were at controlling crime using traditional police methods. 
These were methods involving the police responding to a crime during or after it 
happened, relying on witnesses and collecting evidence, arresting suspects, and then 
trying to elicit confessions from these suspects to support court convictions. A review of 
Britain’s Home Office crime statistics at that time, by Barclay et al. (1993), revealed that 
of all recordable crimes committed there was only a 3 percent conviction rate in the 
courts.103 The report questioned how the police were using their resources and suggested 
that they apply a greater effort toward targeting those individuals known to be 
responsible for crime. 
Pursuing the “usual suspects” implies the police should dispense more resources 
aimed at producing intelligence by targeting known recidivist offenders compared with 
simply responding to the reports of crimes and then commencing investigations. The 
Audit Commission report went so far as stating, “The fundamental objective in 
recommending a clearer management framework, a review of resource levels and 
measures which make better use of resources, is to generate a capacity for proactive work 
which targets prolific and serious criminals.”104 The report transforms the traditional 
paradigm of reactionary policing by highlighting the need for proactive intelligence-led 
strategies. The mantra, “target the criminal, not just the crime,” underscores the police 
need to focus less on the past offense and more on the current behavior of people thought 
to be involved in committing a substantial amount of crime. The value of intelligence-led 
policing is to make efficient use of resources while tackling crime control issues 
proactively. 
In the above definition provided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the 
following quotation is significant: “intelligence-led policing involves the collection and 
analysis of information to produce an intelligence end product designed to inform police 
decision-making at both the tactical and strategic levels.”105 It implies that for police 
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organizations to engage in intelligence-led policing to increase crime control efforts and 
use resources more efficiently, they must first strengthen their own intelligence capacity. 
This is what the Audit Commission (1993) referred to as “generat[ing] a capacity for 
proactive work.”106 
Incorporating the view that intelligence is a structure, a process and a product, 
Ratcliffe (2003) illuminates what is required to advance intelligence-led policing.107 A 
defined organizational structure supports a robust intelligence apparatus within police 
organizations. Personnel with the necessary skill levels and the authority to engage in and 
oversee intelligence operations make up the framework necessary for producing valuable 
intelligence. This calls for police organizations to erect their table of organizations in a 
way that facilitates intelligence exchange and influence over command decision-making. 
It mandates forming policies and protocols that fix intelligence, as a structure, to the core 
of an organization. 
Planning and direction, collection, collation, analysis, reporting, and 
dissemination make up the unremitting process of intelligence. Throughout the process, 
commonly referred to as the intelligence cycle, participants evaluate information present 
at each stage of the cycle. Transforming raw data into intelligence demands that 
intelligence practitioners scrutinize and assess information against the backdrop of other 
data sets or intelligence documents. Dispensing information through this systematic 
process can result in a desired end-product useful for influencing strategic and tactical 
operations. 
This final or finished intelligence product guides decision making at a range of 
levels in a police organization. These products come in various styles dependent on their 
intent or objective.108 Estimative intelligence products focus on what might be or what 
might happen, and offer decision makers outcome-based strategies from which to choose 
when allocating resources for solving crime problems. Current intelligence products 
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speak to daily, weekly, or monthly events in a way that notifies decision makers of 
significant events that affect investigative or enforcement operations. Warning 
intelligence products alert and caution decision makers about issues or events that need 
an immediate response often entailing the pre-positioning of operational forces. Lastly, 
research intelligence products provide operational support for enforcement or 
investigative entities by incorporating all of the above intelligence products.   
At its core, the intelligence cycle is the underpinning of intelligence-led policing. 
The process yields products enabling decision makers to advance sound strategies 
essential for improving the resource allocation process. For those who adopt it, the 
strategic nature of intelligence-led policing transforms police organizations into proactive 
entities capable of targeting the “criminal” as compared to simply responding to a 
“crime.” The practice, considered revolutionary by some, is in direct contrast with 
traditional reactionary policing approaches. 
*** 
The criminal environment is a multidimensional arena consisting of a variety of 
criminals. In some jurisdictions, it includes violent street gang offenders; for others, it is 
primarily burglars or car thieves. For still others, Internet predators or transnational 
criminals involved in the drug trade or jewel theft make up the criminal environment. 
Additionally, under today’s present situation, terrorists potentially also occupy the 
criminal realm across the nation seeking to destroy critical infrastructure sites or to carry 
out another major attack. Significantly, the criminal environment is the place that both 
nurtures and sustains criminality. Regardless, two things are distinct about the criminal 
environment. For one, it exists and second, it is hoped that it can be changed and 
influenced by police strategies.  
The criminal environments that will exist within the Homeland Security Era are 
sure to present unique challenges to state policing institutions. Effecting change in this 
period will call for selecting policing strategies that dedicate resources toward crime 




discussed previously broadly represent the policy options from which state police 
organizations will have to choose from as they go forward. In forthcoming chapters, the 
research will discuss the primary issues needed for consideration when choosing a viable 
policing strategy for state police organizations to follow in the Homeland Security Era. 
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VI. PROJECTING THE OUTCOMES 
Today’s literature universally reports that the attacks of September 11, 2001 were 
a wake-up call for law enforcement relative to the danger of terrorism occurring within 
the United States. In the hours, weeks, and months following the attacks, police 
organizations nationwide scrambled to muster enough resources in response to this new 
threat to the homeland. Often, force deployments became more a reaction to the 
undulations of the day, made more prominent by national color charts forecasting the 
perceived danger levels present in the United States at any given time. It did not take long 
before two issues resonated with police practitioners and policy makers operating in this 
new environment. First, traditional policing strategies were not holding up to the stressors 
involved in advancing Homeland Security. Second, state law enforcement organizations 
would have to allocate significant resources to ensure operational capabilities were 
maintained in this new milieu. This chapter will analyze the alternatives constructed for 
managing state police operations in the Homeland Security venue against the backdrop of 
evaluative criteria discussed in an earlier chapter.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Strategy Canvass 
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In Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the 
Competition Irrelevant, Kim and Mauborgne (2004) discuss using a strategy canvass as 
an analytical tool for capturing the state of play in a market.109 For state police 
organizations, the domain of Homeland Security represents a market in which they need 
to navigate. The strategy canvass offers analysts the opportunity for understanding how 
well strategies will do rooted in factors inherent to that particular market. In referring to 
Figure 4, this strategy canvass captures the evaluative criteria this research has 
considered as essentials for effective policing in the Homeland Security Era. 
The horizontal axis on the above strategy canvass captures six primary factors 
considered fundamental for policing the homeland:  
• Specialized intelligence units 
• A police force trained in intelligence 
• Target objectives designed to increase intelligence operations 
• Strategic actions against criminal networks  
• Intelligence and warning 
• Strategic intelligence planning 
The vertical axis of the strategy canvass captures the degree at which the 
particular policing philosophy supports each of the primary factors listed above. The 
process for plotting a philosophy relative to each of the primary factors was intuitive. A 
high score would mean the referenced philosophy provides a greater capacity to support 
each of the listed factors. For instance, in the case of Strategic Intelligence Planning, a 
higher score signifies the philosophy would sustain this vital activity more so than one 
with a lower score based on the principles of the philosophy itself.  
Figure 4 displays that intelligence-led policing is likely to support those listed 
values considered fundamental to a state police organization engaged in policing the 
homeland. Intelligence-led policing scored high in each of the six primary factors, 
whereas community-policing and the professional model of policing did not fare as well.  
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The answer for this occurrence is rudimentary. Simply put, the factors listed above are by 
nature strategic and involve intelligence operations. Intelligence-led policing lends itself 
to a strategic process that involves intelligence operations. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Three-i model of intelligence-led policing. 
(From: J.H. Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-Led Policing,” Trends and Issues in Crime and 
Criminal Justice 248 [2003], 3.) 
 
Ratcliffe (2003) has simplified an otherwise complex process of intelligence-led 
policing through the depiction of his three-i (interpret, influence, and impact) model.110 
Figure 5 describes how these processes culminate into a strategic action. Ratcliffe 
explains that the intelligence apparatus of a police organization is responsible for 
proactively interpreting the criminal environment for which it has jurisdiction.111 The 
intelligence apparatus achieves this through informants, surveillances, and undercover 
and intelligence operations for which analysts can then assess the information gleaned 
from these activities. Once this process occurs, it is then the responsibility of the analysts 
to construct an image of the criminal environment and convey that picture to decision-
makers.112 To influence decision-makers, the picture the analysts present should include 
recommendations that explore avenues for crime prevention and reduction operations.113 
                                                 
110  Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-led Policing.” 
111  J. H. Ratcliffe, Hard Lessons Won: Intelligence-led Policing and How Intelligence Drives the U.S. 
Operations in the Military, Seminar, Hamilton, New Jersey, November 2005. 
112  Ratcliffe, Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence, 9. 
113  Ibid. 
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The decision-maker is then ultimately responsible for advancing this strategic cycle that 
once started with the decision-maker directing the intelligence apparatus to interpret the 
environment for which the decision-maker must now impact on guided by the 
recommendations of analysts. 
For state police organizations functioning in the Homeland Security milieu, the 
criminal environment is expansive, covering multiple jurisdictions and assorted threats. 
Tackling crime problems associated with Homeland Security requires state police 
organizations to think strategically. Limited by a finite resources, state police 
organizations solving these latest problems have a duty to assign their assets broadly. The 
state police can only carry this out through strategic planning that allocates assets in a 
systematic manner. Reactionary practices of the past, often the mainstay and strength of 
state police organizations, and best seen in their timely response to civil disorders or 
natural disasters, can easily squander assets that would be better focused toward issues 
that represent the greatest threat or risk. Intelligence-led policing provides state police 
organizations with an organizational mindset that encourages decision-makers to allocate 
resources based on intelligence reflective of the criminal environment and strategic 
planning initiatives.  
 
 
Table 2. Policy Options Matrix 
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Table 2 represents an outcome matrix that displays the expected outcomes from 
each of the alternative solutions assembled in Chapter V with respect to the evaluative 
criteria for policing the homeland discussed in Chapter IV. The culmination of several 
independent elements resulted in the production of this heuristic method. A review of the 
existing literature pertaining to the primary policing philosophies provided a basis for the 
analysis revealed in the matrix. In addition, the conceptual underpinnings of each 
philosophy provide the hypothetical suppositions of whether they could sustain the 
Homeland Security initiatives. Moreover, the author’s practitioner experience in policing 
and intelligence served as a barometer for measuring the effectiveness of the policing 
philosophies under the backdrop of the listed evaluative criteria. In New Jersey, there are 
over 550 police departments in which the author has either direct or indirect knowledge 
of their policing philosophies. These experiences enable the author to heuristically assess 
the specific policing philosophies. Additionally, as the matrix demonstrates and a review 
of the literature support, the use of intelligence as a law enforcement tool was not 
envisioned by the proponents of those models. In fairness, however, those models were 
adopted in response to the crimes usually contained in the Uniform Crime Report, which 
often became the barometer on which the success of those models was gauged. Changes 
in the crime rate were usually how outcomes were assessed. Conversely, in the post-9/11 
environment, intelligence-led policing, which is both applicable to crime rates and enjoys 
larger utility in an “all hazards all crimes” approach, is a better fit. 
It is obvious from the matrix that the traditional Professional Model of policing, 
which so many state police organizations are accustomed to using today, is not capable of 
supporting the primary factors essential for policing in the new Homeland Security Era. 
The Professional Model, by nature, is reactionary, grounded in a timely response to 
provide the best service to the public. It is event driven, relying on a police officer to 
respond initially, followed-up by thorough investigations. It places emphasis on 
collecting evidence after an incident, as opposed to producing awareness before a crime 
or event takes place. Any efforts made towards intelligence collection or even training in 
intelligence are secondary, as the police, under this paradigm, aim their attention mainly  
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at information generated during or after a crime or event occurs. Regrettably, as was the 
case on September 11, in the Homeland Security Era, responding to attacks or events that 
are already in motion is a losing proposition. 
The events of September 11, 2001, exposed the shortcomings of the Professional 
Model of policing for defending against threats to the nation’s Homeland Security to 
police managers across the country. Although the authors intended for The 9/11 
Commission Report to bring to light the alleged disconnects and silos within the Federal 
government that prevented information sharing, that same message is equally as valid to 
state police organizations saddled with defending the homeland. State police must 
consider new strategies and they must reorganize themselves to provide unity of effort for 
both information and intelligence sharing. 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ webpage, “as of June 30, 2000, two-
thirds of all local police departments and 62% of sheriffs' offices had full-time sworn 
personnel engaged in community-policing activities. Local police departments had an 
estimated 102,598 full-time sworn personnel serving as community-policing officers or 
otherwise regularly engaged in community-policing activities, and sheriffs' offices had 
16,545 full-time sworn so assigned.”114 Similar figures were not available for state police 
organizations that engaged in community-policing activities. Yet, prior to the advent of 
Homeland Security, the COPS grant mentioned earlier provided federal monies to 
support community-policing efforts. In all probability, most of all state police 
organizations took advantage of this grant and organized community-policing initiatives 
subsidized by federal grant funds. 
As with the Professional Model of policing, the events of September 11, 2001, 
have also proved the community-policing model to be ineffective against terrorists. For 
years prior to the attacks, police agencies across the nation embraced community-
policing, strengthening the bonds between the community and themselves. Yet, 
regardless of the vigor involved with these ties, they did little to alert authorities to the 
devastation that 19 young men would soon bring to America. Counter-terrorism 
professionals attribute this to the tradecraft employed by skilled operatives. Khalid 
                                                 
114  Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Law Enforcement Statistics,” 
[http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm], January. 2006.  
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Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), the architect behind the 9/11 attacks on the United States, 
was a key al-Qaeda lieutenant. He arranged the mission that sent hijacked commercial 
airlines slamming into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania. KSM had instructed the 19 terrorists to keep away from mosques and to 
avoid establishing personal relationships.115 KSM designed these orders to protect the 
mission from compromise. Reviews of the United States travel timeline for all 19 
terrorists clearly depict the terrorists steering clear from diasporic communities or Arabic 
enclaves as they hop scotched the country.116 In fact, with the exception of certain 
instances, the hijackers resided in hotels or motels in the cities they visited. The length of 
their stays was relatively short before moving on to the next hotel. History has 
demonstrated that community-policing by nature, which looks to establish community 
bonds, was unable to ferret out the terrorists. Al Qaeda tradecraft prevented those same 
relationships that police rely on for crime prevention under the community-policing 
paradigm from making a difference. 
The design of community-policing, however, is by nature proactive and involves 
problem solving. Table 2 delineates the community-policing paradigm as scoring high in 
problem solving by supporting “Targeted Objectives Designed to Increase Intelligence 
Operations” and “Strategic Actions Against Criminal Networks.” While this is accurate, 
it warrants a further nuanced explanation. Community-policing specialists expend a 
significant amount of time brokering relationships within the community to develop 
information useful for crime reduction and preventing strategies. In that respect, 
community-policing does support objectives aimed at increasing intelligence, regardless 
if the information is generated before, during, or after an event. In all likelihood, this was 
the case when Mayor Rudolph Giuliani eradicated organized crime from the Fulton Fish 
Market, with the assistance of community-policing measures that supported strategic 
actions against criminal networks. Working with New York City’s range of departments, 
city businesses, and by “amending the administrative code of the city of New York, in  
                                                 
115  9/11 Commission Report, 216. 
116  Paul Thompson, “Complete 911 Timeline,” 
[http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline]. January 2006.  
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relation to the regulation of the Fulton Fish Market distribution area and other seafood 
distribution areas,” the Giuliani Administration released the market from the stranglehold 
of organized crime.117 
Referring to Table 2 again, the Community-policing paradigm scored a medium 
in supporting the factors of “Specialized Intelligence Units” and “A Police Force Trained 
in Intelligence.” This too warrants further explanation. Some researchers associate 
community-policing as the foundation for developing the skills necessary for supporting 
intelligence operations. Dr. David Carter (2004) of the University of Michigan has noted 
that, over the past decade, thousands of specially trained community-policing officers 
have built productive relationships with citizens, which in turn have provided unfettered 
access to neighborhood information as it developed.118 In effect, Carter has successfully 
argued that community-policing initiatives can promote training in intelligence and its 
application among specialized units.  
Similar to plotting the strategy canvass for police management philosophies, 
entering factor scores in the outcomes matrix is also an intuitive process. The last two 
factors, “Intelligence and Warning” and “Strategic Intelligence Planning,” and the scores 
they received in the community-policing row (see Table 2) shed light on this intuitive 
process. There are no data that suggest police organizations applying the community-
policing ideology cannot bear these two processes; however, on the practical side, in 
order to implement an intelligence and warning practice, as well as a strategic 
intelligence planning process, a police organization must develop a sophisticated 
intelligence apparatus that drives the intelligence process and intelligence requirements. 
Police organizations achieving this level of intelligence development will essentially 
transform themselves into an intelligence-led organization, supporting the notion they are 
practicing intelligence-led policing. 
                                                 
117  Marissa L. Morelle, “Something Smells Fishy”: The Giuliani Administration's Effort to Rid the 
Commercial Trade Waste Collection Industry of Organized Crime (New York. The Laborers Network, 
1998), 11. 
118  David Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law 
Enforcement Agencies. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 2004), 40. 
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VII. ASSESSING THE OPTIONS AND MAKING A 
RECOMMENDATION FOR STATE POLICE ORGANIZATIONS 
The central theme of the 9-11 Commission Report criticized government agencies 
for failing to impose the necessary organizational changes that could have prevented the 
disastrous events of 9-11. In effect, government agencies before September 11, the report 
claimed, instead of responding to the growing threat of terrorism and advancing overdue 
organizational change, opted to rely on legacy systems to face the present-day threats. 
Post September 11, the message is clear: government organizations must rethink the way 
in which they do business. For state police executives who accept that organizational 
change is compulsory the challenge is to recognize which is the best plan to follow. The 
previous chapters outlined three distinct policing managerial philosophies, each one 
representing an agenda for change that state police organizations can adopt when 
deciding how to police the homeland. This chapter will analyze the trade-offs between 
each of the outcomes articulated previously and then make a recommendation to state 
police executives on which course of action to choose. 
Despite the course of action selected by police executives, vestiges of former 
managerial philosophies will always be present. For instance, state police organizations 
that may choose intelligence-led policing as a guiding philosophy will continually use 
constituent portions of the Professional Model of policing. This corollary is not 
necessarily negative. Henry (2003) recognizes this phenomenon when he speaks about 
“the gradual dialectical process of reconciling different ideas and practices that result in 
organizations adopting policies and practices of a new philosophy while continuing some 
practices and policies of older philosophies.”119 The outcome is usually a blending of 
constructive components of existing philosophies into the newer one resulting in the 
application of a more robust policing philosophy overall. 
Chapter III summarizes the increased responsibilities that state police 
organizations nationwide are enduring since the advent of Homeland Security. Assessing 
each of the respective policing options against one another for their applicability in 
                                                 
119  Henry,  The COMPSTAT paradigm, 73. 
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today’s milieu, one must consider how policing has changed since September 11. For 
state police organizations that have widespread jurisdictional authority, not only in 
geography but also in function, it is not unforeseen that on any given day commanders 
are challenged by how best to earmark their resources. In an interview with the author on 
January 20, 2006, Colonel Joseph Fuentes of the New Jersey State Police highlighted this 
salient point. “In New Jersey,” he proclaimed, “the constant need to exercise for the 
possibility of multi-event crises is often preempted by their occurrence.” He was referring 
to those taxing instances that demand allocating varied resources en masse toward the 
latest al Qaeda threat alert, an approaching hurricane, rising floodwaters, and a street 
gang bent on attacking police officers. Suppressing these multi-event crises requires 
processes designed to assign resources in a diverse, dynamic, and rapidly changing 
environment. 
 
A. PROFESSIONAL MODEL OF POLICING 
There are benefits for state police organizations that continue the use of the 
Professional Model as their principal style for policing. For one, state police 
organizations are familiar with this type of policing, having practiced it for countless 
years. Since there are no changes to the status quo, continuing the practice of the 
Professional Model does not require organizational change that may upset the 
organizational harmony. There are many advantageous and worthwhile characteristics to 
the Professional Model that include greater efficiency, greater control and accountability 
of personnel, greater cost-effectiveness, and a greater value placed on technology to aid 
with fighting crime.120 
Conversely, there are also disadvantages in adopting the Professional Model in 
the Homeland Security Era. This style of policing is highly reactive, focusing its 
resources mainly on a timely response for calls for service or reports of a crime rather 
than towards intelligence needed for interpreting the criminal environment. It is also 
laden with bureaucracy concerned more with the function of processes than outcomes. In  
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principle, the Professional Model foregoes strategic planning – a critical principle for 
advancing Homeland Security – for a more intransigent posture. Together, these elements 
contradict the Professional Model’s relevance for policing in the Homeland Security Era.  
 
B. COMMUNITY-POLICING 
Community-policing principles center on the social bonds between police and 
citizens. It is these principles that Docobo (2005) contends can help the police to prepare 
for and prevent terrorist acts: “Community-policing helps to build trust between the 
community and law enforcement, which allows officers to develop knowledge of the 
community and resident activity and can provide vital intelligence relating to potential 
terrorist actions. Local law enforcement can facilitate information gathering among 
ethnic or religious community groups with whom police have established a 
relationship.”121 All police organizations, despite their level in government, strive for 
achieving a union with the community they police. Focusing on the relationship building 
with the community is a chief proponent for advancing community-policing as the central 
modality for policing in the Homeland Security Era.  
However, for state police organizations, the community-policing doctrine as a 
central policing philosophy has many shortcomings that preclude its being the primary 
strategic option. First, state police by nature are multi-jurisdictional, employing varied 
requirements responsible for wide-ranging communities not limited to geography. 
Second, retrofitting the community-policing philosophy into state police organizations 
has been an awkward task. Its application in a state’s rural areas, where the state police 
have primary policing authority, has been straightforward. However, in the urban areas 
where the state police do not have this authority, imposing community-policing is not an 
alternative.  
 
                                                 
121  J. Docobo, “Community-policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the 
Local Law Enforcement Level,” Homeland Security Affairs I, no. 1 (2005): 2. 
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Docobo (2005) speaks to developing community partnerships to identify terrorist 
threats against the United States.122 However, the bonds that he relies on for identifying 
these threats may not actually be capable of infiltration or even gaining access to the 
secret societies or the underworld, which the terrorist cell occupies. International terrorist 
groups operating in the United States prefer to remain covert, limiting their interaction 
with only those considered essential for carrying out their mission. This was the case 
during the 2001 terror plot against the World Trade Center and Pentagon, dubbed the 
“Planes Operation” by al-Qaeda.123 The hijackers, preferred living amongst themselves 
moving from motel to motel to guard against unwanted exposure. In the end, community-
policing efforts in place at the time when al-Qaeda operatives traversed the country did 
little for the state and local police in terms of uncovering this conspiracy; a conspiracy 
which led to the deaths of thousands of Americans. Lastly, in the context of state police 
responsibilities, the community-policing model is inadequate for sustaining a system 
capable of assigning various resources to the ever-changing threat that exists in the 
Homeland Security environment. 
 
C. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING  
The surprise attacks of September 11, have in effect, served two overarching 
purposes for state police organizations. They underscored the significance of the need for 
police organizations to apply intelligence as an active defense measure, and more 
importantly, called attention to the need for state police organizations to engender an 
organizational capacity for planning, collecting, processing, and sharing intelligence. 
Intelligence-led policing affords state police organizations with the proper context for 
achieving these two purposes. The central theme of intelligence-led policing – 
interpreting the environment through the intelligence process and then influencing 
decision-makers to act on that environment through finished intelligence products –  
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generates a framework useful for state police organizations that face the 
multidimensional world of advancing Homeland Security and yet, at the same time, must 
respond to traditional forms of crime.  
Alternatively, integrating the principles of intelligence-led policing into otherwise 
traditional state police organizations is a difficult endeavor. State police organizations, 
the epitome of command and control organizational structures, are by nature resistant to 
efforts to transform them. The intelligence-led policing model mandates definitive 
structures and processes that are in direct contrast with traditional reactive policing 
philosophies. The success of intelligence-led policing relies on instituting these wholesale 
changes; without them, any effort to retrofit intelligence in organizational decision-
making will be ineffectual and waste valuable resources. For state police organizations, 
the process of transforming a traditional reactive policing organization into a proactive 
strategic entity is complicated, and not appropriate for less than fully dedicated 
organizations. 
*** 
Policing in the Homeland Security Era requires state police organizations that are 
responsible for a host of Homeland Security obligations, to integrate the proactive 
principles of intelligence to identify problems and then allocate their finite resources to 
address those problems both effectively and efficiently. Of the three options provided, 
only intelligence-led policing affords state police organizations with a system for 
strategically allocating resources based on the needs of the multi-jurisdictional 
environment for which the state police are responsible. 
Intelligence-led policing systems incorporate proactive techniques that include 
strategic planning, surveillance operations, informant development, exploitation of non-
traditional information sources, undercover operations, preventive force deployments, 
and targeted enforcement operations. The intelligence-led policing model, although 
strategic and long-term in temperament, anchors itself directly to the fluid criminal and 
Homeland Security environment. Through various listening posts, represented by 
informants, intelligence centers, and strategic community partnerships, command 
decision-makers can allocate resources appropriately to the Homeland Security threat of 
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the day. Where community-policing models aim to be highly visible and general, 
intelligence-led policing strategies endeavor to remain covert and particular in their 
application of resources.  
Transforming a traditional reactive state police organization into a proactive 
strategic intelligence-led organizational entity will be a difficult but critical endeavor. It 
is to be expected that personnel from organizations that endure such changes will resist 
efforts to change, but the need for this transformation is far too great not to try. State 
police organizations have a vital duty to the states for which they police. This duty now 
extends outside crime control and into the realm of Homeland Security and requires new 
strategies, new systems, and new policies. Intelligence-led policing offers state police 
organizations a robust method for deploying resources strategically against all the 
hazards of the day. 
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VIII. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND INTELLIGENCE-LED 
POLICING IN THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE:  
 A CASE STUDY 
Homeland Security is high on the national agenda. As pointed out in earlier 
chapters, the concept directly affects the way police organizations advance their missions. 
With the exception of large urban area police departments, the new practice of Homeland 
Security has hit state police organizations from across the nation the hardest. The Council 
of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University’s (2005), The Impact of 
Terrorism on State Law Enforcement illustrates the enormity of Homeland Security on 
state law enforcement in their 50-state survey of state and local law enforcement 
agencies.124 The impact, as seen in new responsibilities and new undertakings, has 
changed the way these organizations function. In addition, some have relinquished older 
styles of policing for more innovative practices as a means for confronting the challenges 
present in the Homeland Security milieu. 
Consequently, the NJSP, in recognizing the enormity of providing a blanket of 
Homeland Security to its constituents, has undertaken several strategic initiatives 
designed to ready it for the demands that will certainly continue. One enterprise has been 
the reorganization of its Investigations Branch to sustain the structures and processes 
involved with the paradigm of intelligence-led policing. This case study will provide an 
overview of the organizational changes and processes the NJSP has implemented to 
support intelligence-led policing. 
This researcher directly observed the mechanics of how the NJSP reorganized its 
Investigations Branch to become intelligence-led. The researcher was able to record and 
analyze this phenomenon as it occurred, as well as aid a key NJSP policymaker whose 
responsibility it was to implement the shift to intelligence-led policing. This afforded the 
researcher the opportunity to fully understand the thought processes as intelligence-led 
policing evolved in the NJSP; something usually not accessible in similar studies. The 
work that follows is a direct result of that participant observation.  
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A. THE BACKGROUND OF THE NJSP  
The unified structure of NJSP is quite remarkable in that it performs patrol, 
traffic, criminal investigative, technical services, and emergency management 
responsibilities within a state that boasts a population that hovers somewhere around 8.5 
million. It is comprised of well over 4,500 personnel, enlisted and civilian, spread across 
four distinct Branches: Administration, Investigations, Operations, and Homeland 
Security (see Figure 6). Although the uniformed trooper patrolling the interstates and the 
rural byways remains the backbone of this organization, he or she accounts for only 1/3 
of the organization’s force. The larger majority of troopers is assigned to the additional 
responsibilities as discussed above. 
 
 
Figure 6.   NJSP Command Structure  
(From: NJSP Investigations Branch Reorganization Working Group [2005]) 
 
In the aftermath of September 11, the operational responsibilities of the NJSP 
exponentially increased. In addition to assisting the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
with the investigation into the terror attacks requiring a significant commitment of 
investigative capital, the NJSP supplied the Port Authority Police Department of New 
York and New Jersey (PAPD) with large contingents of personnel. The PAPD that lost 
37 of its officers on September 11, required assistance patrolling the ports, bridges, 
tunnels, and airports under their authority. In addition, New Jersey Transit, the Delaware 
River Joint Toll Bridge Commission, and the Delaware River & Bay Authority also 
called upon the NJSP for assistance with security of their own critical infrastructure. As 
the Homeland Security operational responsibilities increased, the NJSP continued to 
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respond to calls for service, gather intelligence on criminal threats, conduct traditional, 
organized, and high-tech criminal investigations, provide specialized investigative 
support and forensic assets, supply support for the state’s law enforcement information 
and technology network, enforce commercial motor vehicle laws, provide investigative 
support and security for sporting and special events, investigate crimes occurring within 
the Atlantic City casinos, and protect the state house governmental buildings and 
dignitaries. 
Faced with the challenges brought on by the notion of providing Homeland 
Security, the NJSP opted to reengineer its organizational framework to better plan and 
manage its resource allocations in respect to its operational responsibilities. First, a 
Homeland Security Branch was constructed and configured around the organization’s 
duty to mobilize for threats to Homeland Security including large-scale emergencies and 
disasters. The NJSP reconfigured those assets, which were associated with the response 
and mitigation side of Homeland Security. Many of these entities were positioned 
arbitrarily throughout the organization and instead required an arrangement that focused 
reporting under a single command responsible for Homeland Security. Much of what 
occurred in this reconfiguration centered on capabilities-based planning, allowing the 
organization to heighten its efficacy when responding to the amorphous threats related to 
Homeland Security.  
With the Homeland Security Branch formed, the NJSP could now focus on 
transforming its Investigations Branch from one mired in traditional policing practices to 
one capable of confronting the investigative challenges brought on by Homeland 
Security. This responsibility lay squarely on the shoulders of the Deputy Superintendent 
of Investigations who had command over the Investigations Branch. In April 2005, it 
became his duty to institute an agenda for change in order to divorce the Investigations 
Branch from the institutional-stasis in which it found itself. The Deputy Superintendent 
recognized that intelligence-led policing was the most advantageous style of policing for 
the new Investigations Branch to adopt. What follows is a description of the 
organizational changes made to the Investigations Branch in response to the 
implementation of the favored policy option of intelligence-led policing. 
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B. WHY CHANGE? 
The mission of the Investigations Branch has always been to protect New Jersey 
from organized crime, terrorism, violent criminals, and illegal activity. Its mandate 
required employing pro-active investigative measures and the most sophisticated forensic 
science techniques to gather evidence, document illegal activity, and arrest those 
responsible for crime. Over the years, practitioners and commanders alike considered the 
Investigations Branch to be an effective and efficient investigative entity capable of 
combating various traditional crime problems. Yet, owing to the tragedy of September 
11, the landscape in which the Investigations Branch operated had changed. The doctrine 
promulgated by the Federal government – through documents like The 9/11 Commission 
Report and the National Strategy for Homeland Security - about Homeland Security 
practices required that police organizations spend more effort promoting and managing 
the exchange of intelligence both internally and externally. No longer could police 
organizations fail to recognize the importance of intelligence in managing police 
operations or its value in ferreting out suspicious activity linked to crime or terrorism in 




Figure 7.   Investigations Branch as of April 2005  
(From: NJSP Investigations Branch Reorganization Working Group [2005]) 
 
Intelligence is a vital tool in counter-terrorism and crime control. However, it is 
only practical when allowed to influence decision-making. In April 2005, the 
organizational structure of the Investigations Branch prevented this. The Investigations 
Branch contained three separate and distinct sections; the Investigations Section, 
Intelligence Services Section, and the Office of Forensic Sciences (see Figure 7). Each 
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section contained their own bureaus, which contained individual units. This structure lent 
itself to a host of architectural issues that impeded intelligence exchange and ultimately 
nullified the influence, both internally and externally that is so critical for intelligence-led 
policing, counter-terrorism and crime control initiatives within an organization. The 
decentralized structure, which preferred a functional focus rather a geographic one, 
produced stovepipes within the organization, separating investigative specialties from one 
another.125 What resulted was a silo effect scattered throughout the Investigations Branch 
where the efforts of one element did not adequately draw upon or share resources with 
another’s, regrettably creating esoteric units in direct competition with one another.126 
These disconnects affected the Investigations Branch’s ability to perform at its fullest 
capacity. The consequence for this alignment was the inability for intelligence to 
influence decision-making at the strategic and tactical levels, the inability to properly 
allocate personnel and resources, and the inability to plan for future crime problems and 
catastrophes. 
Interestingly enough, testimony before the 9/11 Commission from Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, former Attorney General Janet Reno, and former FBI Director 
Louis Freeh shed light on the legal barriers that precluded information sharing between 
law enforcement and intelligence-gathering officials.127 Some of what these 
distinguished officials spoke to was the way in which operations took place among the 
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). Information gleaned from intelligence gathering 
operations, sanctioned under National Security guidelines, could not be commingled with 
                                                 
125  Note: The focus on function was a predominant attribute to the units that proactively investigated 
organized criminal activities that included street gangs, traditional and non-traditional organized crime, 
narcotics, and intelligence operations.  
126  Note: This organizational phenomenon is not restricted to the NJSP or for that matter, to police 
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The Wisdom of Crowds (New York: Anchor Books, 2005), 214.  
127  Note: The audio version of The 9/11 Commission Report contains public testimony by Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, former Attorney General Janet Reno, and former FBI Director Louis Freeh held 
before the commission on April 13, 2004.  
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criminal investigations. Essentially, it would take two JTTF members to further a 
terrorism investigation. One would focus on the intelligence aspect, the other the criminal 
investigative component if the opportunity arose, “never the two shall meet.” Fortunately, 
the USA PATRIOT Act tore down the infamous “wall” that many believe impeded the 
“unity of effort” for drawing on all the relevant sources of information needed to defeat 
terrorism. For the NJSP Investigations Branch, there too was a “wall” that existed and 
prevented information and intelligence sharing. 
On the federal level, it was legislative rulings that created this notorious barrier 
and hampered information sharing. Conversely, within the NJSP Investigations Branch, it 
was human resistance to sharing information, not legal precedence that best explained the 
formation of the “wall” erected between the Investigations Section and the Intelligence 
Services Section. The 9/11 Commission Report, in its chapter detailing how to organize 
government toward a unity of effort in sharing information, revealed that human 
resistance to information sharing as the biggest impediment for connecting the proverbial 
dots needed to defeat groups determined to bring harm to the United States. For the 
Deputy Superintendent of Investigations, convinced that intelligence-led policing would 
be the preferred paradigm for policing in the Homeland Security Era, he recognized the 
immutable purpose of tearing down this “wall.” 
 
C. STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS 
Transforming the NJSP Investigations Branch from a traditional investigative 
entity into a robust intelligence-led apparatus would require significant changes to its 
current organizational architecture and culture. Advancing this change entailed five 
strategic interventions that included removing architectural barriers, adopting the 
processes intrinsic to an intelligence-led policing philosophy, creating a “Fusion Center,” 
retooling the distribution and management of its Statewide Intelligence Management 
System, and adopting a regional accountability plan for managing intelligence and 
enforcement operations related to organized criminal activities. 
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1. Removing Architectural Barriers 
To address the first strategic intervention, the Investigations Branch significantly 
modified its organizational structure. The former Investigations Section and Intelligence 
Services Section would drastically reconfigure their resources to become the new Special 
Investigations Section and the new Intelligence Section. With the exception of minor 
modifications, the Office of Forensic Science remained unchanged by the reorganization. 
The newly formed Special Investigations Section (See Figure 8) would now 
consist of investigative units to provide statewide service related to highly specialized 
computer, forensic, violent crime, and compliance review investigations. The NJSP 
command also placed the Casino Gaming Bureau, responsible for crimes against the 
casino industry and its patrons in Atlantic City, under the command of the Special 
Investigations Section. With limited exception, the focus of the newly formatted Special 
Investigations Section was to be event driven or reactive in nature.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Newly Formed Special Investigations Section  
(From: NJSP Investigations Branch Reorganization Working Group [2005]) 
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Conversely, the newly arranged Intelligence Section (Figure 9) was to be 
proactive in nature, designed to target criminal conspiracies responsible for traditional 
and non-traditional organized crime, drug trafficking, street gang activity, and suspected 
terrorist activity through progressive intelligence operations. The NJSP devised this new 
framework to support cross directional intelligence and information exchange to better 
influence command decision-making. Under the previous arrangement, the former 
Intelligence Bureau was responsible for intelligence collection only. This resulted in two 
negative outcomes for the Investigations Branch. First, it provided others in the Branch, 
regardless of their focus on proactive investigations with a reason not to engage in 
collecting crime intelligence. For those not assigned to this function, having a dedicated 
group of intelligence units somehow translated into, “intelligence is not my job.” In 
addition, with the intelligence collection function relegated to a single bureau, the 
organizational structure essentially created a silo that prevented the free flow of 
intelligence. 
Additionally, the former Intelligence Section buried its analytical function deep 
within its table of organization. The positioning of the former Analytic Support Unit and 
Training/Analytical Unit within this bureaucratic morass prevented analysts from 
exerting necessary influence over command decision-making. There were just too many 
layers of bureaucracy to penetrate for timely information exchange to occur. This 
disconnect transcended the internal network of the Intelligence Services Section across 
the Investigations Branch to the Investigations Section. On many occasions, intelligence 
products generated by analytical resources never made it to potential consumers within 




Figure 9.   Newly Formed Intelligence Section  
(From: NJSP Investigations Branch Reorganization Working Group [2005]) 
 
The formation of the new Intelligence Section sought to build a framework that 
facilitates the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. The former 
Intelligence Bureau, Street Gang Bureau, and Narcotics & Organized Crime Bureau 
merged to form three regional Organized Crime Control Bureaus (OCCBs). The primary 
mission of these new regional bureaus is to collect intelligence on three primary crime 
programs, organized crime, drug trafficking, and street gang activities. In addition, these 
bureaus have a duty to ferret out intelligence related to other threats to Homeland 
Security, for instance, threats to the state’s critical infrastructure. The north and south 
OCCBs each added an additional unit to reflect the particular crime problems in their 
geographic area. The Cargo Theft Unit, since major airports and seaports were located in 
northern New Jersey, and the Casino Unit, located in the southern part of the state in 
Atlantic City. The overall Intelligence Section arrangement acts as a force multiplier, 
increasing the amount of field intelligence collectors exponentially.  
To elevate the stature of its crime analysis and strategic direction function, the 
NJSP fitted intelligence groups within the command of the Intelligence Section and its 
regional OCCBs. The Strategic Intelligence Group (SIG), positioned within the 
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Intelligence Section Commander’s staff, is comprised of a team of analysts and an 
intelligence collection manager. The analysts, split by the crime programs involving 
organized crime, drug trafficking, or street gang activities, view the Intelligence Section’s 
intelligence function from a strategic perspective. Their role is to provide strategic 
intelligence products to assist the Intelligence Section command in resource allocation 
and strategic direction. The analysts also liaison with the regional bureaus on a frequent 
basis to exchange information critical to the planning and direction needs of the Section. 
The bureau chief from the Intelligence Management Bureau fills the position of 
intelligence collection manager, responsible for overseeing the Intelligence Section’s 
planning and direction activities. 
At the regional level, the Regional Intelligence Groups (RIG) contain both 
analysts and intelligence officers responsible for interpreting the criminal environment 
within each bureau’s specific area of responsibility. They are accountable to their 
respective commands for providing strategic and tactical intelligence products intent on 
influencing how best to allocate resources. The analysts are each responsible for the 
primary crime programs involving organized crime, drug trafficking, or street gang 
activity. The expectation is that they communicate daily with the field units who direct 
their resources at the same criminal activities. The intelligence officers assigned to the 
regions will manage the intelligence collection plan and assist with liaising with entities 
both internal and external to the bureau. Embedding the intelligence groups within each 
regional command ensures that a rigid bureaucratic framework does not interrupt timely 
influence. The regional focus in turn equates to greater horizontal authority, which 
devolves accountability to the regional bureau chiefs that have the authority to alleviate 
stovepipes.128 
 
2. Adopting the Intelligence-Led Policing Philosophy 
When the NJSP imposed the architectural changes discussed above, they did so 
with the intention of ascending the processes necessary for intelligence-led policing. The 
plan was to infuse the intelligence cycle directly into the core of the Investigations 
Branch’s architecture, policies and procedures, thereby influencing organizational 
                                                 
128  J. Michael Barrett (Security Specialist and Author, Counterpoint Assessments), interview with 
author, Annapolis, MD, February 13, 2006.  
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decision-making. The NJSP interprets the intelligence cycle as depicted in Figure 10. As 
of this writing, the NJSP commissioned a project that would explore each element of the 
intelligence cycle and then document the findings in a handbook. The intelligence manual 
would be available to the entire organization, regardless of assignment, and would 
delineate what is required on the application of intelligence. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Intelligence Cycle  
(From: NJSP Investigations Branch Reorganization Working Group, Intelligence Manual 
Project [2005]) 
 
Transforming the Investigations Branch from a traditional policing entity to being 
intelligence-led became the central focus of the reorganization project commissioned by 
the Deputy Superintendent of Investigations. He directed a significant amount of 
resources applied toward the design, training, and implementation of Planning & 
Direction and Analysis & Production, two specific intelligence cycle components that 
rarely receive attention in American policing operations. The way in which the NJSP 
embraced these two components, without exception, represent the progressive stance this 
organization has taken toward a true intelligence-led policing model. 
The NJSP designed its intelligence planning and direction process to align all of 
its intelligence operations strategically while remaining adaptable to respond to the fluid 
nature of the operational environment. Although the NJSP command sets the broad 
priorities within the strategy, the intent of the process is to devolve initiative and 
decision-making authority for how those priorities are addressed to the subordinate 
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command levels. Planning and Direction entails managing the global intelligence effort 
of the organization with the needs of the intelligence consumers in mind. On the strategic 
level, commanders from the NJSP and partner agencies epitomize a typical consumer. At 
the tactical level, the consumer may be a field detective or uniformed trooper. 
Establishing success in this strategic venue requires that decision-makers have the 
relevant intelligence products allowing them to allocate resources more effectively and 
efficiently. When decision-makers do not have the requisite intelligence to prioritize 
assets, their practical effectiveness decreases significantly and the squandering of 
resources often follows. It is the goal of the Planning and Direction process to align 
resource allocation with the threats exhibited in the criminal environment.129 
 
 
Figure 11.   Intelligence Planning & Direction Process 
(From: NJSP Investigations Branch Reorganization Working Group, Intelligence 
Planning and Direction Project [2005]) 
 
The Planning and Direction process engages the start and finish of the intelligence 
cycle. At the beginning, it involves developing specific requirements. While at the end, 
                                                 
129  Dean Baratta (Analyst, NJSP), interview with author, West Trenton, NJ, October 21, 2005. 
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finished intelligence often produces new information requirements. For the NJSP, the 
Planning and Direction process (see Figure 11) is composed of seven steps:130 
• Step 1: Developing the Statewide Intelligence Estimate 
• Step 2: Developing the Statewide and Regional Collection Intents 
• Step 3: Developing Collection Plans 
• Step 4: Collection Tasking   
• Step 5: Dissemination  
• Step 6: Evaluating reporting 
• Step 7: Updating Collection Plans 
 
 
Figure 12.   Statewide Intelligence Estimate  
(From: NJSP Investigations Branch Reorganization Working Group, Intelligence 
Planning and Direction Project [2005]) 
 
The primary step of the Planning and Direction process, developing the Statewide 
Intelligence Estimate, underscores the NJSP’s commitment towards the Analysis and 
Production component of the intelligence cycle. The Statewide Intelligence Estimate, 
once fully implemented will be produced annually for the Superintendent, and consist of 
four segments (Figure 12):  
                                                 
130  Dean Baratta (Analyst, NJSP), interview with author, West Trenton, NJ, October 21, 2005. 
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a) The Statewide Strategic Assessment of Organized Crime Threats - is 
an assembly of multiple source information products concerning the regional 
pervasiveness of various organized criminal activities; the criminal networks involved in 
these activities; and the relationships between “clusters” of criminal activities.131 
b) The NJSP Capabilities Assessment – is a self-reported evaluation by 
NJSP investigative units that identifies current capacities for addressing various 
organized criminal activities.  
c) The Operating Environment Overview - describes the legal, political, 
demographic, social, and economic factors that may have influence over NJSP command 
operations during the period covered by the estimate. 
d) The Vulnerability Assessment - categorizes and assesses industries, 
geographical areas, or populations in terms of their susceptibility for exploitation by 
organized criminal elements or terrorists. The NJSP determines vulnerability as the area 
where the criminal capabilities and intentions overlap with environmental factors that 
indirectly sustain criminal opportunities.132 
The intent of the document is to provide NJSP command with direction on 
engaging threats present in the criminal environment and within the Homeland Security 
domain with respect to how best to allocate resources to address the problems. 
A principal feature of intelligence-led policing involves the collection and 
analysis of information to produce intelligence products necessary for influencing 
decision-making at both the tactical and strategic levels. The NJSP, modeling the Central 
Intelligence Agency in interpreting its intelligence products, has begun producing four 
finished intelligence products: 
• Current Intelligence – addresses day-to-day events, seeking to apprise 
consumers of new developments and related background, to assess their 
significance, to warn of their near-term consequences, and to signal 
potentially dangerous situations in the near future. Current intelligence is 
                                                 
131  Note: In January of 2006, the Intelligence Section’s Strategic Intelligence Group (SIG) completed 
its first Statewide Strategic Assessment of Organized Crime Threats. For calendar year 2006, in place of 
the Statewide Intelligence Estimate, this analytical product will guide commanders in resource allocation 
planning.  
132  Dean Baratta (Analyst, NJSP), interview with author, West Trenton, NJ, October 21, 2005. 
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presented in daily, weekly, and some monthly publications, and frequently 
in ad hoc memorandums and oral briefings to senior officials. 
• Estimative Intelligence – deals with what might be or what might 
happen. Like all kinds of intelligence, estimative intelligence starts with 
the available facts, but then migrates into the unknown, even the 
unknowable. The main roles of estimative intelligence are to help 
policymakers navigate the gaps between available facts by suggesting 
alternative patterns into which those facts might fit and to provide 
informed assessments of the range and likelihood of possible outcomes. 
• Warning Intelligence – sounds an alarm or gives notice to policymakers. 
It connotes urgency and implies the potential need for policy action in 
response. 
• Research Intelligence – is presented in monographs and in-depth studies. 
Research underpins both current and estimative intelligence; there are also 
two specialized subcategories of research intelligence: basic intelligence 
and intelligence for operational support.133 
Fundamentally, the design of these products will answer the particular questions 
needed to aid consumers in their essential job functions. In this respect, a consumer is 
analogous to the decision-maker, regardless of their level in the NJSP. Some intelligence 
products contain actionable recommendations that guide decision-makers. Others instead 
are historical in nature, and provide perspective to past and current crime problems. The 
Statewide Intelligence Estimate, cited above, is an example of an estimative intelligence 
product. It is forward-looking in its attempt to forecast events or situations. It will aid 
NJSP command decision makers in setting resource allocations for the coming year, 
basing such decisions on objective analysis as compared to subjective bias. 
 
3. Creation of a Fusion Center 
The creation of the Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC), New 
Jersey’s answer to a fusion center, is the third strategic initiative of the Investigations 
Branch reorganization. It focuses on producing current intelligence and warning 
intelligence products. The ROIC is a bifurcated entity, consisting of two NJSP Units, the 
Intelligence Center Unit (ICU) and the Operations Center Unit. A civilian director, who 
reports directly to the Superintendent of the NJSP, oversees the ROIC. This director also 
                                                 
133  Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Public Affairs), A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence 
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), 4. 
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chairs a governance committee comprised of a diverse set of public safety officials who 
represent the stakeholders the ROIC must serve for its mission to be effective. The ICU is 
the component in the ROIC responsible for the rapid collation, analysis, and 
dissemination of information related to Homeland Security and criminal investigation 
endeavors. The ICU is comprised of four squads that cover a 24 hour, seven day a week, 
watch center operation. Each squad contains a sergeant, two detectives, and two analysts. 
The personnel are trained in querying a variety of information and intelligence systems 
they have direct access to while serving the greater law enforcement community. The role 
for which the ICU fills is vital towards preserving the essential state of Homeland 
Security readiness within New Jersey. Through rapid intelligence exchange, the ROIC 
will relentlessly grant Homeland Security officials the opportunity to aid in the 
preemption of a potential terrorist attack. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Regional Operations Intelligence Center Information Process Flow  
(From: NJSP Investigations Branch Reorganization Working Group, Intelligence 




Everyday, analysts assigned to the ROIC pore over scores of documents 
containing information and intelligence about Homeland Security and criminal activity. 
The documents, generated by the NJSP’s own intelligence apparatus and a diverse set of 
Homeland Security partners, hold bits of information, some more relevant than their 
innocuous counterparts. The job of the ROIC analysts is to rapidly assess all available 
information pieces and draw linkages between them that may avert a terrorist or criminal 
act. Acting as the nerve center for the State’s Homeland Security mission, the ROIC has 
the capacity to provide tactical information feedback to consumers on a twenty-four hour 
basis. Information that flows through the ROIC undergoes internal fusion; analysts 
compare, contrast, and mingle information with other data sets from a broad range of 
traditional and non-traditional sources. Here the analysts have the unique opportunity to 
apply the “value added” analysis that can convert an innocuous piece of information into 
a relevant nugget of intelligence that becomes actionable to the constituents it serves 
(Figure 13 illustrates this flow of information as it enters the ROIC and then is pushed 
back to consumers in the form of finished intelligence products). In governing this speedy 
process, the ROIC has the unique capability to produce warning intelligence products for 
its expansive base of consumers. The ROIC can connect the proverbial dots from the 
pieces of information it processes. In addition, the ROIC produces current intelligence 
products in the form of a daily and other periodic intelligence bulletins. The bulletins 
target consumers with Homeland Security and crime control responsibilities. 
 
4. Retooling SIMS Distribution 
A solid intelligence platform, one that promotes and facilitates intelligence 
reporting, is integral to the process of generating intelligence products necessary for 
influencing decision-makers. Without the intelligence report, there are no intelligence 
products. Without intelligence products, there is no intelligence-led policing. “The key, 
mundane but imperative, is raw intelligence collection. If collection improves, so will the 
intelligence and analysis, and ultimately the “dots” get connected. This, of course, is the 
weakest link – ensuring that collection occurs from the eyes and ears in the field.”134 The 
                                                 
134  J. Michael Barrett (Security Specialist and Author, Counterpoint Assessments), interview with 
author, Annapolis, MD, February 13, 2006. 
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NJSP, in recognizing these important concepts, understood that the intelligence-led 
policing process fundamentally begins with the intelligence report. The intelligence 
report is the vehicle by which NJSP and partnered agencies’ field collectors could report 
indigenous information about the criminal environment to command decision-makers. It 
was therefore essential for the NJSP to reorient the manner in which they distributed the 
Statewide Intelligence Management System (SIMS) in an effort to bolster the primacy of 
the intelligence report and channel its positive aftereffects. The fourth strategic 
intervention for transforming the NJSP Intelligence Branch into an intelligence-led 
policing entity called for retooling the SIMS strategy. 
In the past, delivering SIMS to the diverse law enforcement community had been 
an enormous undertaking. The Investigations Branch expended significant time, 
resources, and personnel in teaching and deploying this intelligence management 
software application without much return on investment. The NJSP attributed this to the 
complexity of the software and to a fundamental lack of understanding by its users of the 
application of intelligence. A usage audit revealed the overwhelming majority of SIMS 
users had not submitted an intelligence report since leaving training. Except for personnel 
already trained in intelligence, those filing intelligence reports were reporting on post-
event information. Although this type of information is valuable and actionable for 
furthering an investigation or for starting another investigation, it is reactionary in nature 
and promotes the traditional model of policing from which the NJSP is now steadfastly 
avoiding.  
According to Huremagic (2003) and Manning (1992), since information is the 
“critical feature in modern societies,” information is the essence of any successful and 
fruitful criminal investigation.135 The paramount challenge becomes when the police 
actually receive the information: before, during, or after an event. Ostensibly, if the 
police receive information before an event they are in the best position to prevent or 
disrupt the event altogether. However, this proactive style of policing requires the police 
to advance the methods of surveillance, informants and undercover and intelligence 
                                                 
135  R. Huremagic, “Intelligence Led Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovia - the Issues for Debate.” 
[http://www.10iacc.org/content-ns.phtml?documents=300&art=39]. November 2004.  P. Manning, 
“Information technologies and the police.” 
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operations to a higher level. These specialized intelligence techniques require particular 
skill sets by those responsible for deploying them, and can be a significant draw on 
resources for those police organizations not conditioned in using them. 
In returning to the case of SIMS, the review of the usage numbers was telling. To 
begin with, in replacing its former intelligence database, the NJSP intended for SIMS to 
service skilled intelligence detectives, those who were currently practicing and had 
instruction performing those proactive methods discussed above. Yet, when the software 
application was introduced to users who had no prior experience with intelligence or its 
application, the training curriculums were not changed to accommodate those 
inexperienced in intelligence operations. What resulted was either under-use because 
SIMS did not fill the needs of these users, or instead, some users submitted their 
investigation reports (evidence-based, reactive) into a system originally designed to 
capture premonitory information.136 This simple observation had significant policy 
implications for the future distribution of SIMS, and is “generalizable” to other police 
organizations that now endeavor to create intelligence-led forces. 
SIMS may well be the bedrock that anchors the processes needed for the NJSP to 
carry out intelligence-led policing. In that regard, NJSP commanders felt it was pressing 
to revamp the established SIMS distribution strategy both internal and external to the 
NJSP. At the time of this report, the new SIMS Unit, created within the Intelligence 
Management Bureau was developing a strategic plan to accomplish this new endeavor. 
The plan, designed to educate and integrate new users on employing SIMS to manage 
                                                 
136  Charles Frost and Jack Morris. Police Intelligence Reports: A Compendium on Police Intelligence 
Reporting Formats and Procedures. (Orangevale, California: Palmer Enterprises, 1983), 32. Note: Frost and 
Morris differentiate between investigative and intelligence reporting by attributing the principal difference 
in the meaning of two words: evidentiary and premonitory.  The following passage has been directly cited 
from their work: 
Evidentiary – Investigative reporting is evidentiary in nature. It presents statements and information, 
that, taken as a whole, satisfy the elements of proof of a past criminal offense. A report of investigation 
should describe whatever is to be reported – fully exactly and plainly – without opinion or amplification. 
The manner in which this information is gathered must, of course, conform to strict rules of criminal 
procedure if the defendants are to be successfully prosecuted.  
Premonitory – Intelligence reporting, on the other hand, is premonitory.  Webster’s dictionary defines 
premonitory as – to alert, to warn, and to provide advance information. Intelligence reporting does not have 
prosecution as its main objective. This form of reporting is meant to point police organizations in the 
direction of potential criminal activities that require specifically targeted investigations or alert them to 
future public safety threats to which tactical responses may be required. By its very nature intelligence 
reporting cannot be expected to meet the rigorous standards for investigative reporting.  
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information related to the many facets and levels involved in the intelligence process, 
would customize its delivery to a particular user group. In addition, the new training 
curriculum combined with advances in other technology applications would allow users 
to leverage information collection methods to obtain information “before, during, and 
after an event.” The necessary adjustments to the SIMS delivery would ensure that it 
delivers a robust intelligence system needed to support the policies and practices of an 
intelligence-led policing organization in the Homeland Security milieu. 
 
5. Adopting Regional Accountability 
The final strategic intervention of the Investigations Branch reorganization 
involved adopting a regional accountability approach for managing intelligence and 
enforcement operations. Preceding the reorganization, command decision-making 
conformed to a functional specialization paradigm. In other words, the NJSP conducted 
its intelligence operations, narcotics and organized crime operations, and street gang 
investigations, under individual commands represented by bureaus of the same names. 
The captain of each bureau had command responsibility over decision-making involving 
these individual modalities. This outdated system served to erect information silos within 
each of these functional programs. An organized crime figure from northern New Jersey 
trafficking narcotics in the same region would often present a bureaucratic quandary in 
headquarters requiring mediation at the highest levels of the organization. In addition, the 
statewide landscape in any one of these crime programs was more than any one command 
could handle. It meant each bureau chief was responsible for identifying with the 
organized crime problems of 21 counties. Conversely, if a particular county needed 
assistance from the NJSP, in the venue of proactive investigations, they would need to 
speak with three separate bureau chiefs. These issues combined to erect barriers for 
information sharing that further alienated otherwise willing partners, both internal and 
external, to the NJSP, not an attribute particularly conducive for the application of 
intelligence-led policing. 
The Investigations Branch reorganization redefined the role of command over 
proactive investigative entities within its organizational structure. The command focus 
shifted from a functional specialization to a geographic authority. The NJSP reconfigured 
79 
and redeployed investigative entities from intelligence, street gang, organized crime, and 
drug trafficking elements to three regional commands in the northern, central, and 
southern areas of the state. This shift divided the bureau chiefs’ responsibility by three, 
allowing them to better identify with all the crime problems in that particular area of the 
state they were assigned. Conversely, a county or region now has a single point of contact 
regarding proactive investigations, which so often intermingle together. The geographic 
focus now promotes intelligence and information sharing within the region among 
investigative elements both internal and external to the organization. It ensures that 
information-sharing barriers are broken and that criminals who extend beyond the 
borders of single criminal endeavors are effectively and aggressively pursued by joint 
elements in the region under a single command. This new structure allows for a parallel 
shift in the fundamental unit of accountability toward a regional focus rather than to 
individual investigative performances. This is significant as the NJSP advances the 
concept of intelligence-led policing which lends more emphasis on understanding the 
criminal environment and Homeland Security domain prior to allocating resources 
toward tactical operations. The central element to intelligence-led policing is for the 
police to understand the environment; “if you know the baseline, you will certainly spot 
the anomaly.” It is critical then that state police commanders and detectives not just know 
their silo, but understand the milieu they operate inside. Under this paradigm, the state 
police become “Renaissance Cops” as compared to “Silo Cops.”137 
The new arrangement also provides regional commanders the agility needed to 
redeploy regional investigative forces if called on to augment the investigative assets of 
another organization or a significant event. The events that followed September 11, 
demonstrated the need for this organizational agility. In the wake of the attacks, the NJSP 
assigned a significant portion of its investigative assets to temporarily assist the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) with investigating leads. Because of the systems in place at 
the time, the distribution of NJSP resources severely crippled the organization’s capacity 
of addressing its other crime program responsibilities. Today, the new regional command 
approach will limit any impact on NJSP investigative resources if called on again to aid 
                                                 
137  J. Michael Barrett (Security Specialist and Author, Counterpoint Assessments), interview with 
author, Annapolis, MD, February 13, 2006. 
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with a national crisis. Moreover, the regional commander is also in a better position to 
liaison with other allied commanders in the region who share mutual responsibility over 
operations, investigations, and other Homeland Security concerns. 
Concerning the JTTF, during the Investigations Branch reorganization the NJSP 
reconfigured its resources investigating terrorism, and tripled the personnel assigned to 
the FBI’s JTTF. Investigating terrorism is a specialized and tenuous vocation, requiring 
significant intelligence and investigative resources that extend outside the territorial 
boundaries of the United States and outside the legal purview of state and local laws. The 
JTTF offers the NJSP a seat at the table for engaging in the nation’s investigative war on 
terrorism, and provides access to relevant intelligence necessary for pre-positioning 
security forces to protect the state’s infrastructure. The NJSP dispersed its compliment of 
troopers regionally between the northern and southern regions of the state, to the Newark 
and Philadelphia FBI offices. 
 
D.  ASSESSING THE OUTCOMES 
Conventional wisdom offers the opinion that organizational change will take time 
to crystallize in the hearts and minds of the people who must endure it. Tuckman and 
Jensen (1977) best explain the interpretation of managing change and transition through 
their stages of group development (Form, Storm, Norm, Perform).138 As personnel 
experience the process of developmental change, creating group norms becomes an 
integral part toward success. The NJSP is no different in the way it adapts to 
organizational change. The intelligence-led policing philosophy is a significantly 
different approach toward policing than the more traditional methods familiar to NJSP 
personnel. This approach requires personnel, specifically those in command positions, to 
approach their duties in a different way. Of course, as expected, consternation is often the 
result.  
To aid with getting through the storm and creating the group dynamics necessary 
to strengthen the developmental processes surrounding intelligence-led policing, the 
NJSP turned to subject-matter experts from outside the organization. Following the 
                                                 
138  M.K. Smith, “Bruce W. Tuckman - Forming, Storming, Norming and Performing in Groups, The 
Encyclopedia of Informal Education,” [www.infed.org/thinkers/tuckman.htm]. January 2006. 
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maxim, “you cannot be a prophet in your own land” the NJSP enlisted the expertise of 
the Manhattan Institute Center for Policing Terrorism. The Manhattan Institute, a 
distinguished think tank from New York City, began educating and consulting the New 
York City Police Department in counter-terrorism principles following the attacks of 
September 11. In that time, the Manhattan Institute added the NJSP to its short list of 
police organizations for which it consults concerning Homeland Security. The Manhattan 
Institute provided a host of seminars designed to educate NJSP members in the benefit, 
skills, and processes surrounding the application of intelligence. Each seminar featured 
presenters with an expertise in the application of intelligence or intelligence-led policing. 
In addition, the Manhattan Institute provided the necessary counsel to the NJSP for 
adapting the requisite command processes needed for adopting intelligence to guide 
organizational decision-making. 
Another particularly useful instrument the NJSP command will have to gauge the 
effectiveness of the application of intelligence and intelligence-led policing within the 
Investigations Branch is the new E-daily put into service in January of 2006. The E-daily 
is a computerized time tracking system that records the time NJSP members work. The 
designers of the first generation of the E-daily system geared it primarily towards 
recording tasks that were in line with those working in uniform field operations. The 
design offered little to commanders in the investigative domains in terms of gaining an 
accurate picture of how and where their personnel were spending their work time. 
Today’s second generation E-daily now accommodates the nuances involved in the 
specialized field of criminal investigation and intelligence operations. As this new design 
evolves, commanders will be able to evaluate their personnel on a range of criteria to 
include the application of intelligence. In addition, the information contained within the 
E-daily system will aid commanders in resource allocation and analysts with producing 
the annual NJSP capabilities assessment. 
In the fall of 2005, the NJSP instituted its new architecture within its 
Investigations Branch to engender intelligence-led policing. In all likelihood, it will take 
at least a year to evaluate the new policies, protocols, and processes the NJSP has in 
place. However, the new architecture itself can be assessed against the backdrop of the  
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evaluative criteria deemed vital for policing in the Homeland Security. These criteria are 
further delineated as operational readiness, creating intelligence and warning, and 
producing strategic intelligence planning. 
Israeli National Police Brigadier General Simon Perry, during a Suicide Bomber 
Seminar at Princeton University in the Spring of 2004, defined operational readiness as a 
police organization’s capacity to support specialized intelligence units, a police force 
trained in intelligence, target objectives designed to increase intelligence operations, and 
strategic actions against criminal networks.139 When the Investigations Branch 
reconfigured its architecture to promote intelligence sharing and intelligence influence 
over command decision-making, it essentially strengthened each of General Perry’s 
attributes of operational readiness within the NJSP Investigations Branch. The amount of 
detectives now assigned to field units, which have a primary mission of collecting 
intelligence, has exponentially grown from less than 20 to over 140. With this growth the 
NJSP has and will continue to see requisite training in the tradecraft of criminal 
intelligence collection expand. What have resulted are criminal investigations that are 
strategic in nature. As an example, prior to the Investigations Branch reorganization 
investigators assigned to the Street Gang Bureau could initiate criminal investigations on 
targets regardless if those targets were identified in threat assessments. Today, analytical 
assessments inform and guide operations against gang activity by the NJSP. 
The Investigations Branch reorganization has also significantly bolstered the 
ability for the NJSP to provide intelligence and warning both internal and external to the 
organization. The ROIC, a twenty-four hour intelligence center, is rapidly evolving into a 
dedicated fusion center that combines intelligence resources from traditional and non-
traditional sources. It currently produces current and warning intelligence products for 
wide dissemination within the state and to interstate Homeland Security partners. In 
addition, the arrangement of analytical resources affords the ROIC the unique ability to 
supply criminal investigative support to partnered agencies. 
Lastly, the strategic intelligence planning criteria called for in advancing 
Homeland Security is an area the Investigations Branch has thoroughly embraced. The 
                                                 
139  Simon Perry, Police intelligence lecture presented at the Suicide Bomber Seminar sponsored by 
the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs held Princeton, New Jersey, Spring 2004. 
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NJSP has imposed a host of new procedures, policies, protocols, and training curriculums 
that reflect the importance of strategic intelligence planning within its Investigations 
Branch. In addition, the analytical component of the Intelligence Section completed the 
first in the NJSP’s eighty-five year history a preliminary version of a Statewide 
Intelligence Estimate. This document will guide command decision-makers of where best 
to earmark intelligence and investigative resources based on the capabilities of the NJSP, 
the threat posed by criminals, and the vulnerabilities that present opportunities for 
organized criminals and those seeking to commit terrorist acts against the homeland. The 
Intelligence Section will produce the Statewide Intelligence Estimate yearly, which will 
launch the strategic intelligence and planning process outlined above. 
*** 
Reorganizing the NJSP Investigations Branch embodies two main ideas. First, the 
architecture unmistakably sustains the necessary processes compulsory for the 
intelligence-led policing philosophy. Second, by nurturing this innovative intelligence-
driven framework, the organization clearly advances the obligatory criteria considered 
essential for policing in the Homeland Security Era. When the NJSP chose intelligence-
led policing as an agenda for change needed to separate from the traditional reactive style 
of policing, it positioned itself as a leader in the Homeland Security community. The 
measures the NJSP has put in place to confront the investigative challenges of Homeland 
Security have operationalized Abraham Lincoln’s famous words, “As our cause is new, 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
A.  POLICING THE HOMELAND 
The calamitous events of September 11, 2001, provoked a realization that police 
organizations nationwide must better organize themselves to defend the homeland against 
an asymmetric threat. The threat, represented by a foreign enemy with the ingenuity, 
desire, and wherewithal to penetrate America’s conventional defenses, may still be living 
among us. This notion has transformed the police from crime fighters to defenders of the 
homeland. The challenge is great considering the advent of Homeland Security presses 
the need for operational readiness, intelligence and warning, and a strategic planning 
outlook embedded directly into the core of state police organizations. 
For state police organizations, the metamorphosis requires far greater change than 
for the majority of their county and local counterparts. The nature of state police 
obligates them to bear the bulk of new duties and responsibilities coupled with this new 
era of Homeland Security. Of course, for these organizations forced to balance crime 
control with security, a homeland defense mandate will certainly induce change. It will 
compel them to shed traditional reactive styles of policing for more proactive methods 
considered necessary for tackling problems before they mature and potentially cause 
colossal destruction or impact on the state; all while continuing to respond to the plethora 
of issues intrinsic to traditional policing. 
An amalgam of disparate elements make up today’s model for Homeland 
Security. Guided by legal and social influences, these elements include intelligence and 
warning, border and transportation security, domestic counter-terrorism, protection of 
critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic threats, and emergency 
preparedness and response. Taken together, they require changes in the way in which 
state police perform and how they choose to allocate their resources. Achieving these 
fundamental qualities, commands an agenda for change vital towards separating 




B.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Against the backdrop of these Homeland Security rudiments and by applying a 
policy options analysis framework, this thesis compared and contrasted three policing 
paradigms. The research assessed the professional, community-policing, and intelligence-
led policing models for their practical application in the Homeland Security Era. The 
intent of the investigation was to advocate for a suitable agenda for change, in respect to 
one of these paradigms, that a state police organization could espouse in order to tackle 
the challenges of promoting Homeland Security. In the final analysis, it was intelligence-
led policing that proved favorable towards advancing operational readiness, intelligence 
and warning, and strategic intelligence planning, all to better protect our citizens. 
The Homeland Security milieu is a volatile and amorphous realm, accounting for 
an environment that both criminals and terrorists endeavor to exploit. Taking charge of 
this environment requires police decision-makers to commit the essential assets aimed at 
interpreting its threats. Through the cycle of intelligence, decision-makers can effectively 
allocate resources compulsory for addressing the problems revealed within the 
environment. The intelligence-led policing model, a system that depends on the 
production and dissemination of finished analytical products aimed at influencing 
decision-makers, will widen an organization’s capacity for engaging multiple 
responsibilities. Consequently, this thesis argues that intelligence-led policing is the 
principal policing paradigm necessary for planning and supporting the various enterprises 
that state police organizations will inevitably encounter while providing a blanket of 
Homeland Security. 
The NJSP Investigations Branch was used extensively as a test case because, in 
carrying out this preference of intelligence-led policing as its primary agenda for change, 
it underwent a notable reorganization. The restructuring amounted to a transformation 
from a traditional policing entity to one that is now intelligence driven. The 
transformation included removing architectural barriers, adopting the processes intrinsic 
to an intelligence-led policing philosophy, creating a “Fusion Center,” retooling the 




adopting a regional accountability plan for managing intelligence and enforcement 
operations related to organized criminal activities of a criminal or terrorist nature. By 
adopting the intelligence-led policing model, the Investigations Branch amplified its 
capabilities for confronting the investigative challenges of the Homeland Security Era. 
 
C.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Previous research has demonstrated that intelligence-led policing is an effective 
crime reduction strategy. Yet, concerning Homeland Security, there are no quantitative or 
qualitative studies that assess the effectiveness of an intelligence-led policing program. 
With the adoption of intelligence-led policing by the NJSP there exists a notable 
opportunity for future research in this remarkable field. A prospective research project 
may include assessing the process outputs and outcomes that intelligence-led policing 
ought to generate as it endeavors to influence organizational decision-making. In 
addition, by evaluating how intelligence-led policing disrupts potential criminal and 
terrorist activity through defusing opportunities and vulnerabilities that sustain illicit 
activity, police commanders can construct a framework useful for managing 
accountability in the intelligence-led policing domain. 
A comparative in-depth study of how the Israeli National Police, London’s 
Metropolitan Police, and the Police Service of Northern Ireland apply and optimize the 
intelligence-led model would be a useful product for police managers in the United States 
to assess. For a considerable amount of time, these foreign law enforcement organizations 
advanced the intelligence model in a way that permeates the structure of their entire 
organizations. Such a study would not only examine their hierarchal structures, but 
through interviews of commanders and officers on the street, could illuminate 
organizations such as the NJSP, on how to facilitate its acceptance through a changing 
culture of policing.  
Further research should also be conducted into the areas of the limitations of the 
intelligence process and how to work around them, methods to improve data collection 
from a variety of uniformed and civilian sources, integration with private sector data 
aggregation services, and alternate analysis processes such as enemy “red teaming” and 
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